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Executive summary 
 
The focus of this thesis is twofold; first the focus is on general standardization 
theory, and thereafter the theory is applied to the Office Open XML (OOXML) 
case. The thesis analyses the economic impacts of compatibility standards, and 
hereunder applies the results to examine the economic impacts of the international 
document standard OOXML. A focus will be on markets characterised by 
network externalities. Another focus will be comparing the private and social 
incentives for standardization. In order to answer the research questions, relevant 
economic theories is presented and economic models are derived. The authors will 
also present independent work and new interesting findings.   
 
The main findings are that in a market characterised with network externalities, 
complete compatibility increases equilibrium prices and total output. This is 
shown in the compatibility model by Katz and Shapiro. The increase in prices is 
also supported by the network model related to compatibility. The reason is that in 
a network market, incompatibility decreases prices since consumer demand 
becomes more sensitive. However, when introducing compatibility, consumer’s 
buying decision is not affected by the network externalities. The move to 
complete compatibility is found to be socially beneficial in the compatibility 
model. 
 
Regarding the private and social incentives for achieving compatibility, both the 
Katz and Shapiro model and the oligopoly quality model show that these deviates. 
A result is that the private incentives are inadequate since the firms are unable to 
extract the full social benefit of achieving compatibility. 
 
The thesis discusses the compatibility and openness of the international standard 
OOXML, and relates this discussion to it’s the economic implications. The 
findings suggest that OOXML offers compatibility. Given this is so for the future 
full implementation of OOXML; it might be possible to conclude that the 
OOXML standard leads to increased total output, and hence increased welfare for 
consumers through achieving compatibility. Based on the analysis of how the 
openness requirements are met by OOXML, it is possible to see that the openness 
of OOXML is somewhat controversial. 
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the case in a comprehensible way, so that the reader is able to evaluate our 
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We would like to thank our supervisor Professor Espen R. Moen for helpful 
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Oslo, 1
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 September 2009 
  
GRA 19002 Master Thesis                                                                          01.09.09  
8 
 
1. Introduction 
 
When starting the process of writing this thesis during the spring semester 2008, 
the authors had experienced a problem of incompatibility between different 
software versions of Microsoft Word. One of the authors used Microsoft Word 
2003, and was therefore unable to open and edit files created by the other author 
in Word 2007, unless the document was made compatible by converting it to the 
Word 97-2003 version. This became a source of inspiration for the general 
analysis of standards and whether achieving compatibility is socially beneficial. It 
will therefore be interesting to study the economic implications of compatibility 
standards in general, and the case of Office Open XML. 
 
The move towards open standards has been a strong trend within office document 
file formats since users demand compatibility. Software vendors have therefore 
had incentives to ensure that their preferred document file formats are endorsed as 
open standards. Microsoft does not publish the market share of Microsoft Office, 
however it is assumed to have a global market share of approximately 95% 
(Business Week 2006). Since the majority of the global market use Microsoft’s 
document software, the thesis will focus on the modifiable office document file 
format standard “Office Open XML” (OOXML). The OOXML standard was 
initiated for standardization by Microsoft, together with its industry partners and 
supporters. It is therefore interesting to study the economic implications of the 
XML-based standard that is supported by the dominant firm in the market 
Microsoft, i.e. OOXML. 
 
This thesis consists of six parts. In the first part the reader will be introduced to 
the background for the case, as well as the aim of the thesis and the research 
question. In the second part, definitions of standards and the motivation for 
standardization will be given. This part will provide examples illustrating why 
standards are important. This basic introduction of standards is provided in order 
to facilitate the understanding of the models which will be presented in the 
subsequent parts.  
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The third part of the thesis will study the economic implications of compatibility 
standards, where a thorough description and derivation of different models will be 
given. Hereunder, first, network externalities will be explained and described as 
these characterise the software market. A network model with a monopoly 
producer will be presented, and the authors of this thesis will here extend the 
network model by Pepall et al. (2005) to include a constant marginal cost. 
Thereafter, a network model related to compatibility, developed by the authors of 
this thesis, will be presented. Thirdly, a compatibility model by Katz and Shapiro 
(1985) will be presented. The compatibility model will derive the economic 
impacts of achieving compatibility on the market equilibrium and the effects for 
the agents. Hereunder, a parallel will also be drawn to an oligopoly quality model, 
developed by the authors of this thesis. This model will show that firms provide a 
too low level of quality or compatibility compared to what is socially optimal. The 
models can be studied independently of the OOXML case; hence, they provide 
valuable theoretical insight into the economic effects of standards. Additionally, 
the models may provide insight about the economic implications of Office Open 
XML. In the fourth part of the thesis, open standards will be described and a 
model of economics of open standards will be presented. The model can provide 
insight about the economic implications of open versus proprietary standards.   
 
The fifth part of the thesis will discuss the case of OOXML. The theory discussed 
in the preceding three parts will here be applied in the analysis of the international 
standard OOXML. Hereunder, the background of office document formats and the 
OOXML standard will be presented. Thereafter, the compatibility and openness of 
OOXML will be analysed. Finally, the sixth part of the thesis will present the 
conclusion for the research questions based on the results found in the preceding 
parts. 
 
1.1. Background for the case of OOXML 
 
1.1.1. ISO/IEC 29500:2008 
In addition to analysing the economic implications of compatibility standards, this 
thesis will also analyse the standard “ISO/IEC 29500:2008, Information 
technology – Document description and processing languages - Office Open XML 
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(OOXML) file formats”. ISO/IEC 29500 is a standard for word-processing 
documents, presentations and spreadsheets. It is intended to be implemented by 
multiple applications on multiple platforms. ISO/IEC DIS 29500 was originally 
developed as the Office Open XML specification by Microsoft Corporation, and 
received in April 2008 the necessary number of votes for approval as an ISO/IEC 
International Standard (ISO 2008a). The International Organization for 
Standardization/International Electrotechnical Commission Join Technical 
Committee 1 (ISO/IEC JTC 1) approved the standardization of OOXML through 
a fast-track process. 
 
ISO is the leading organisation of formal standards bodies. It is a network of 
national standards institutes of 157 countries with one member per country (ISO 
2008b). Membership is a mixture of national partnerships of industry associations 
and institutions which are a part of the governmental structure or mandated by the 
governments of their home countries (Ditch 2007:10-11). 
 
1.1.2. The format that is causing the debate 
Computer software for reading, creating and editing content can be grouped into 
two categories; software which enables creation and editing of content, and 
software which display or print content. These two software categories manipulate 
content which is stored as a file on for example a hard disc, and it is the format of 
this file which is causing the debate that motivates this analysis (Ditch 2007). 
Document file formats are the way a computer stores documents like memos or 
spreadsheets. 
 
Early in the product lifecycle of personal computers there was a great amount of 
different word processing applications available. These applications often used 
binary file formats
1
 with a proprietary, undocumented standard as the basis for the 
exact representation or encoding. As a result, software vendors were unable to 
read formats from other vendors, and there was a strong connection between the 
content and the software that had created it. This made it difficult for users to 
exchange documents with each others, since there was a great variety of 
                                                 
1
 A computer file containing machine-readable information that must be read by an application; 
characters use all 8 bits of each byte (WordnetPrinceton 2009) 
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incompatible software. When the personal computer market matured in the 1980s 
a fairly small number of proprietary file formats dominated the market. The 
dominating proprietary file formats were amongst others generated by companies 
as Corel Corporation, with their word processing format WordPerfect, Lotus 
Software with their spreadsheet format Lotus 1-2-3 and Microsoft with its Word 
(.doc), Excel (.xls) and PowerPoint (.ppt) file types. (Ditch 2007:4). 
 
1.1.3. Developing a common document format 
The challenges related to the lack of interoperability between documents created 
in different software, resulted in a process of developing a common document 
format. There was also a need for abstracting the information in a document and 
separating this from its presentation. Thereby, the information could be 
independent of the software that created it. The final outcome was the new mark-
up language standard “Extensible Mark-up Language (XML)” developed by The 
World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) in the 1990s. This is a standard format that 
enables the storage and organisation of information. Information stored in an 
XML file is in plain text format, enabling the separation of content from 
representation. Hence, information stored as XML will be readable and 
changeable for a long time, as opposed to binary file formats. In fact, there is 
diminishing acceptance for the use of binary file formats, especially those that 
require the use of proprietary software (Ditch 2007:5).  
 
1.1.4. Move towards standardization of XML file formats 
There has also been increased pressure to standardize file formats, involving 
formal standards setting organisations (SSO). This encourages software 
producers, such as Microsoft, to “open” previously closed file formats, i.e. 
proprietary, binary file formats (Ditch 2007:11). In addition to OOXML there is 
another internationally recognised office document file format for editing, namely 
ISO/IEC 26300:2006 Open Document Format (ODF) for Office Applications. 
This standard was approved by ISO in May 2006 and was voted unanimously by 
the participating members (Mathew 2008:6). It was Sun Microsystems which led 
the creation of the ODF standard as a response to Microsoft’s proprietary formats. 
For non-revisable office documents, Adobe Portable Document Format (PDF) has 
become a de facto standard for display and distribution of such documents. 
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However, the ODF standard and the Adobe PDF standard will not be in focus in 
this thesis. The OOXML file formats has caused substantial controversies 
concerning both the need for two co-existing ISO standards for open XML 
document formats and the OOXML format’s supposed lack of openness.  
 
1.2. The aim of the thesis 
 
The aim of the thesis is to apply relevant, acknowledged economic theories to 
describe and analyse compatibility standards in general. The thesis will also, 
based on the general standardization theory, analyse the case of the international 
standard OOXML. The analysis will therefore concentrate around the 
compatibility and openness of standards in general, and OOXML in particular. 
Hence, this thesis is twofold; first the focus will be on general standardization 
theory and thereafter this theory will be applied to the case. The aim of the thesis 
is to provide a better understanding of standards for achieving compatibility and 
open standards. It will be important to analyse standards’ economic implications 
on the market. Regarding the economic implications, it is the effect on the market 
equilibrium that is of interest. Thereby, it is possible to study the effect on the 
producers and the consumers. When analysing the case of OOXML it will be its 
economic implications that are in focus, rather than its technological aspect. 
 
1.3. The research question 
 
The main research question of this thesis is therefore: 
 
“What are the economic impacts of compatibility standards?” 
 
Hereunder, a sub-research question for the thesis will be: 
 
“What are the economic impacts of “ISO/IEC 29500:2008 Information 
technology – Document description and processing languages - Office Open XML 
file formats?” 
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The research questions will be addressed by using applied microeconomics. The 
thesis will give an economic analysis of compatibility standards and, hereunder, 
the international standard OOXML, with focus on the compatibility and openness 
of standards. When analysing the economic impacts of compatibility standards, it 
is the effects on the market equilibrium for producers and consumers that will be 
in focus. In other words, the effect for software suppliers and software users will 
be in focus for the case of OOXML. It will also be relevant to study whether the 
private incentives for achieving compatibility are in line with the social 
incentives, and thereby studying whether firms have sufficient incentives for 
standardization.  
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2. Standardization 
 
In this section of the thesis, first definitions and classification of various standards 
will be given. Thereafter, motivation for standardization will be discussed. This is 
in order to provide a better understanding of standards before presenting the 
theoretical models and analysis of the case. Standards can be studied from 
different perspectives and this review will focus on the economical perspective. 
 
2.1. Definition 
 
There are several definitions of standards and some will now be presented. One 
definition of standards is that standards “define any common set of product 
features, which can range from loose sets of product characteristics to precise 
specifications for technical interfaces” (Grindley 1995:21). This is similar to 
Ditch’s definition, who defines standard as “commonly accepted agreements for 
doing or making things” (Ditch 2007:39). The official definition by ISO and the 
IEC is the following: a standard is a “document, established by consensus and 
approved by a recognized body. It provides rules, guidelines or characteristics for 
activities or their results, aimed at the achievement of the optimum degree of 
order in a given context. Standards should be based on the consolidated results of 
science, technology and experience and aimed at the promotion of optimum 
community benefits” (IEC 2009). 
 
Following, standards will be further classified into the difference between quality- 
and compatibility standards, the control the firm has over the standard, the 
standardization process, and standards as common goods. 
 
2.1.1. Difference between quality- and compatibility standards 
There is a classification difference between quality standard, which is related to a 
product’s features, and compatibility standards, which is related to the links a 
product has to other products and services. Quality standards may further be 
divided into minimum attributes, such as measurement and quality, and product 
characteristics. Compatibility standards will be of interest for this thesis. They 
define the interface requirements that allow different products, often from 
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different producers, to use the same complementary goods and services, or to be 
connected in networks (Grindley 1995:9). Complementary goods need to be 
consumed together in order for the user to obtain utility, and two examples are 
audio speakers and players or computer hardware and software. An example of a 
complementary service is supporting services like automobile maintenance for 
automobiles. The complements may also be direct networks of users of the same 
core product, for example telecommunications networks or railway routes 
(Grindley 1995:23). Most relevant for the information and communication 
technologies (ICT) is the standardization which ensures interoperability or 
compatibility between different parts of a product or between products as part of a 
system or network (Ditch 2007:39). 
 
2.1.2. The control a firm has over a standard 
Additionally, a key distinction of standards is the control the firm has over the 
standard. This can depend on how accessible a standard is, in other words whether 
it is proprietary or open. If the standard is proprietary, one firm has proprietary 
rights over the standard and may therefore restrict the adoption of the standard by 
other producers or implementers. If the proprietor holds intellectual property 
rights to the technology a standard is based on, like patents or copyrights, it may 
charge royalties for access to it. With a completely open standard no restrictions 
are placed on other firms adopting the standard (Grindley 1995:25). Proprietary 
standards are excludable since the proprietor of the standard control the licensing 
of the standard. Open standards are non-excludable and might therefore be 
classified as a public good (Mathew 2008:3). Bresnahan (2001) also divides 
document format standards into two concepts; proprietary and open. Proprietary 
standards imply that each software brand for word processing stores files 
differently. An open standard implies that any program for word processing will 
be able to read files from other programs. The openness of standards will be 
further discussed in part four of this thesis. 
 
2.1.3. The standardization process 
The method by which standards are established and maintained can be two 
different processes. Either it can be through market forces, i.e. a de facto standard, 
which results from the interaction between “clubs” of agents or through a single 
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agent. In other words standard setting is through a market-mediated process. The 
other process is standardization through official standards bodies, i.e. a de jure 
standard. De jure standards are specified by standards bodies before adoption in 
the market. The latter include government legislations, industry committees, and 
quasi-official standards associations (David and Greenstein 1990). 
 
Many standards may in practice be developed by a dominant firm in the market or 
be an outcome of a standards contest. Even consensus or legislated standards may 
originate from the dominant firm. Standards that may now seem as universal may 
at one point have been a result of a standards contest, for instance railway gauges, 
electric supply voltages and screw threads (Grindley 1995:25). The difference 
between de facto and de jure standards is hence not precise. 
 
2.1.4. Standards classified as economic goods 
Standards may be characterised as non-rival, implying that the distribution of a 
standard will not decrease its availability. This means that the use by one person 
will not prohibit other people from using the standard and will not cost additional 
resources. Hence the cost of distributing or using standards is approximately zero. 
It is the knowledge in the standard that is non-rival, not the specific product that 
has implemented the standard (Scotchmer 2004).  
 
Public goods are non-rival and non-excludable. However, since standards are not 
necessarily non-excludable, they cannot automatically be considered as public 
goods. This is because it may be possible to selectively exclude agents from using 
and adopting a standard through ownership or licensing terms, and excluding 
agents in the standardization process. If only a limited amount of firms cooperate 
to set standards, the process of standard setting will be excludable, even though 
the adoption of a standard might be freely licensed and thereby non-excludable. 
Influential firms in the standard setting process can therefore gain competitive 
advantage because they are able to encode the standard based on their own skills 
and knowledge (Mathew 2008).  
 
As mentioned in the previous sections, is it possible to classify standards into 
proprietary and open, de jure and de facto standards. In Figure 1 standards are 
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classified along the two axes De facto/De jure and Proprietary/Non-proprietary 
and thereafter related to economic goods: 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Classification of standards related to economic goods 
(Mathew 2008:3) 
 
A standard may be classified as a non-pure private good under monopoly 
conditions, where a single firm or coalition of firms sets a proprietary standard. 
Such a standard is hence proprietary and de facto. An example is Microsoft Office 
since Microsoft has never released complete format specifications for the binary 
file formats.  
 
Standards may also be classified as a club good if one of the following two 
conditions is met; firstly, no new firms are allowed to join the group of firms 
sponsoring the standard or, secondly, no new firms are allowed to join the group 
of firms licensed to adopt a standard. Under the first condition, the sponsoring 
club has a large competitive advantage since they may be able to form standards 
to fit their particular skills and knowledge. Under the second condition, the 
licensing club may result in a closed network of firms which cooperates as a cartel 
to create service systems. 
 
A standard may further be classified as a public good if the standard setting 
involves negotiations within a standard setting organisation (SSO), i.e. a non-
 
Public good 
Quasi-public good 
Non-proprietary 
Club good 
Non-pure private good 
De jure 
De facto 
Proprietary 
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proprietary and de jure standard. Thereby the standard is often freely licensed, 
which yields low adoption costs, and the standard may be considered as open if 
the standardization process fulfilled certain open characteristics. 
 
Standards which are set through de facto standardization and not submitted to a 
SSO, but remains freely licensed, may be classified as a quasi-public good. An 
example is Adobe’s PDF file format since Adobe published complete technical 
specifications for PDF with every new version of the format. Now, various forms 
of PDF are ISO standards, while Adobe remains a key technical sponsor (Mathew 
2008).  
 
2.2. Motivation for standardization 
 
This section will draw attention to the motivation for standardization. In our 
everyday life, we are surrounded by standards. A few examples are paper size, the 
three-letter code for currency names, the size of bolts and screws, the basic 
features of credit cards and the ISBN-number in a book. The examples mentioned 
are probably not something people are aware of; nevertheless, standards play a 
key role as they can have economic impacts on the society. Since these 
implications can be considered as significant, it is interesting to analyse the effects 
a standard has on the market. The following sections will therefore discuss the 
advantages of standards, systematisation through standards and standards’ role in 
the ICE sector. 
 
2.2.1. Advantages of standards 
This section will give some examples of advantages that have been obtained 
through standards. For instance, standard setting may lead to economies of scale, 
which the following example will illustrate. A classic example that is often 
illustrated to show that having one standard leads to economies of scale is the 
standard railway gauge. The British Parliament enacted the Gauge Act in 1846, 
requiring all railroads to conform to the standard gauge (Kindleberger 1983).  
Having the same standard on railway gauge made it easier and more cost efficient 
for trains to travel across region borders without the need of changing coaches or 
transhipping the goods.  
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Standard can also be used to fulfil safety requirements. For example, when buying 
an electronic device in Norway the user can be sure that the plug will fit the 
socket and that it is adapted to the country’s level of voltage. An example of how 
a non-existing safety standard led to severe damages can be illustrated from the 
fire in Baltimore on February 7, 1904. The enormous fire required help from the 
nearby city, Washington DC. However, when the fire-fighters arrived, their hoses 
would not fit the Baltimore hydrants and this resulted in over 1000 burnt houses 
and damages for over 100 million dollars (Weitzel et al. 2006:55). 
 
Another reason for why a standard may be advantageous is that it signals the 
fulfilment of a certain level of defined characteristics. Being so, it can for instance 
decrease the transaction costs for agents. Standards can for instance assure a user 
that an intermediary good or component can be integrated successfully in a larger 
system that includes complementary goods.  This may be illustrated by the 
example of the hi-fi stereo system. Since the components conform to the same 
compatibility standard, the consumer can be assured that when buying for instance 
a new sound amplifier from one producer, it can be integrated successfully in the 
larger system of the stereo with products from another producer (David and 
Greenstein 1990). Other relevant examples are the DVD standard or the CD 
standard. 
 
2.2.2. Systematisation through standards 
Standards can help to systematise our surroundings as they can simplify and make 
things more efficient, and can further reduce risk since standards are known in the 
market. One meter is one meter regardless of whether you are in China, the US, 
Bolivia or Norway, and this is because the metric system is described as a 
standard. Before standardising the metric system, there were differences of the 
length of a foot or an inch depending on where in the world one was situated. This 
could be challenging when trading across national borders, as disagreements 
could occur on which foot that was correct. The need for systematising 
measurement arose, which was solved by introducing a common agreed set of 
standards, i.e. the metric system. 
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2.2.3. The role of standards in the ICE sector 
Further motivation for standards is that they can be considered a key fundament in 
the world and drive an extensive part of the information economy. They are a 
result of systems where complementary products work together to meet the needs 
of consumers. The importance of standards is also increasing because of its 
significant influence for a rapidly growing sector of the economy, namely the 
information, communication and entertainment (ICE) sector. Standards are 
required in information systems in order to store, retrieve and manipulate 
information (Shapiro 2000). Most new industry initiatives in this sector focus on 
the concept of compatibility, which is one of the fundamental goals of 
standardization (Cargill and Bolin 2007:298).  It is argued that standards form one 
of the pillars in the information society and that the Internet would not exist, as we 
know it today, without standards (West 2007). One of the most valuable 
technological advances of the late 20
th
 century is proclaimed to be standards that 
connect computers to large servers with web paged, electronic commerce sites and 
corporate databases (Bresnahan and Yin 2007).  
 
Markets for system goods are relevant for the case that this thesis will analyse 
since document software can be characterised as a system good. In such markets 
compatibility standards play a crucial role. These standards are technical 
specifications that determine how compatible various technologies are, e.g. that 
you are able to run a particular software on your computer or playing music on 
your CD-player. These standards are important in system goods markets since 
standard setting is linked to the exploitation of network externalities (Bresnahan 
and Yin 2007). More and more people demand to take part in networks that allow 
them to for instance exchange documents, communicate directly, share databases, 
having access to a wider selection of compatible software or combine products 
made by different vendors. The above demands can be achieved through 
compatibility standards, as this is often a requirement for multiple parties to be 
able to share and distribute information (West 2007:93). 
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3. Economics of compatibility standards 
 
In economic terms compatibility generally means interoperability between 
competing products. The main concern for standardization in the information and 
communication technologies (ICT) industry is compatibility in the presence of 
network externalities. Hence, in the ICT industry, standardization mainly signifies 
achieving compatibility. 
 
A presumption for achieving compatibility might be that compatibility will lead to 
more competition within a market, and hence lower prices. However, as the 
following economic models will show, the prevailing equilibrium market price 
under compatibility will increase due to network externalities. Although 
compatibility increases market prices, achieving full compatibility may be socially 
beneficial due to higher market output. The economic impacts of standardization 
should therefore be analysed in terms of costs and benefits of firms, consumers 
and the society. 
 
In the following sections, first network externalities will be explained and 
described as these characterise the software market. A network model with a 
monopoly producer will be presented. The authors of this thesis will here extend 
the network model by Pepall et al. (2005) to include a constant marginal cost. The 
model will analyse the potential for multiple equilibria in a market with a 
monopoly provider of a network service. Thereafter, a network model related to 
compatibility, developed by the authors of this thesis, will be presented. It is based 
on the network externality model by Moen (2008) with our own modifications for 
compatibility, hereunder to include a parameter for compatibility. This model is 
developed in order to analyse how the degree of compatibility can affect the price 
competition in a software market with two firms. The anticipated conclusion is 
that compatibility will decrease price competition. Thirdly, a compatibility model 
by Katz and Shapiro (1985) will be presented. The compatibility model will 
derive the economic impacts of achieved compatibility on the market equilibrium 
and the effects for the agents. The model will also analyse whether private 
incentives for achieving compatibility are consistent with the social incentive. 
Hereunder, a parallel will also be drawn to an oligopoly quality model, derived by 
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the authors of this thesis, which will show that firms have insufficient incentives 
to provide quality, in other words compatibility. The anticipated conclusion of the 
compatibility model by Katz and Shapiro (1985) is that achieving compatibility 
will increase output and hence the social welfare. Examining these models can 
give important insights when analysing the economic impacts of standards. 
 
3.1. Network externalities 
 
The document software market is characterised by an important feature, namely 
network externalities. A reason that many consumers use Microsoft Office may be 
that they expect others to use it as well. The more consumers who use Microsoft 
Office, the more utility Microsoft Office will yield for its users since the network 
of users will increase. Therefore, in the following section of this thesis, network 
externalities will be explained and analysed. 
 
First, a definition of network externalities will be given. Subsequently, a network 
model with a monopoly producer based on the work of Pepall et al. (2005) will be 
presented. The authors of this thesis will here extend the model by Pepall et al. 
(2005) to include a constant marginal cost. The model will show that in a market 
with a monopoly provider of a network service, multiple equilibria may occur. 
Thereafter, distinctions between direct and indirect network externalities will be 
discussed related to compatibility. 
 
3.1.1. Definition 
Network externalities can change both the characteristics of a market and the 
nature of the industry competition. A network externality will exist when a 
consumer’s valuation of a product increases as the number of users increases. 
Each additional consumer will obtain private benefits by joining the network, but 
also provide external benefits on existing consumers. A definition of a network 
externality can therefore be “a benefit conferred on users of such a product by 
another’s purchase of the product” (Page and Lopatka 1999:953). 
 
With network externalities the value of a product to any one consumer will 
increase due to the additional consumers that buy the product. It is the existence 
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of interdependence between the portion of the market being served and 
consumers’ willingness to pay that will lead to network externalities (Pepall et al. 
2005). An individual consumer will only take into account her own value of 
joining the network. She will, in other words, not take into consideration the 
external advantages she generates when becoming a member of the network, nor 
the impact when leaving it. When a consumer becomes a member, this will 
increased the value of the network since the network size will be larger, and in 
contrast, the value will decrease when a consumer leaves the network (Pepall et al. 
2005:617).  
 
As a network generally must be large in order to become feasible, an observed 
tendency is the outcome of either one, i.e. monopoly, or two suppliers, i.e. 
duopoly. A supplier will have strong incentives for reaching the so-called “critical 
mass” (Rohlfs 1974), which is the lower fraction that must be obtained in order 
for the network to become sustainable. If the network has not breached this point, 
customers will then have an interest to wait to join until others do so. This critical 
mass point will be illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
Since consumers do not take into consideration the network externalities, a 
network may never reach an optimal size. In other words, the network will not be 
equal to the socially efficient network size, thereby, a deadweight loss will occur. 
Another interesting side of this phenomenon is when incompatible standards 
compete. This may result in “tipping” of the market, often towards the standard 
that obtains an early advantage, i.e. the standard which obtains a larger network 
size in the beginning of a standard contest (Page and Lopatka 1999). 
 
3.1.2. Network model with a monopoly producer 
Following, a network model with a monopoly producer will be derived, where the 
market is characterised by network externalities. The model is based on the work 
of Pepall et al. (2005) and will be expanded by the authors of this thesis to include 
a constant marginal cost. The network model is presented for the general 
understanding of network externalities, in addition to providing a better 
understanding of the market relevant for the OOXML standard, i.e. the document 
software market. 
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The network model that will be derived by the authors of this thesis differs from 
the network model by Pepall et al. (2005) since it includes a constant marginal 
cost. In networks like a broadband network, a marginal cost may occur when an 
additional consumer joins the network. This might be the case when the 
broadband network is still under development, since the broadband network needs 
to be expanded for each additional consumer. However, when the broadband 
network is completely developed, the marginal cost for an additional consumer 
joining the network will be approximately zero. 
 
Assume that a monopolist operates a network, and charges the consumers an 
access fee in order to hook up to the network, but no per-usage price. This means 
that the monopolist charges the consumer price 𝑝𝑓  in order to “hook up” to the 
network, but every single use of the product is free of charge. Assume a constant 
marginal cost c for producing the good. This is a new element to the model by 
Pepall et al. (2005), extended by the authors of this thesis. The network is more 
valuable for the consumers the more users that are connected to the network. 
Consumer 𝑖 will have a willingness to pay in order to become a member of the 
network equal to 𝑓𝑣𝑖 . The variable 𝑓 represents the size of the network, which can 
be considered as the fraction of the population “hooked up” to the network. The 
variable 𝑣𝑖  represents the consumer’s reservation price for consuming a good, and 
the parameter is assumed to be drawn uniformly between 0 and 100. The variable 
𝑣𝑖  is hence the marginal willingness to pay for network size. 
 
The demand consumer 𝑖 has to hook up to the network is given by: 
𝑞𝑖
𝐷 =   
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑓𝑣𝑖  < 𝑝𝑓
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑓𝑣𝑖 ≥ 𝑝𝑓
     
 
The equation above shows that the influence of network size works through the 
variable 𝑓. For consumer 𝑖, the equation states that the consumer’s willingness to 
pay for the service 𝑓𝑣𝑖  increases with the portion of possible consumers 𝑓 that 
have joined the network. As mentioned earlier in section 3.1, there exists 
interdependence between the willingness to pay and the fraction the market 
served. It is this interdependence that leads to network externalities. Additionally, 
each consumer of the network only considers the value to herself of joining the 
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network (Pepall et al. 2005:616). Assuming that there are N consumers in the 
market, the consumers’ total willingness to pay (𝑇𝑊𝑃𝑓) for access to the network 
is hence: 
𝑇𝑊𝑃𝑓 =  𝑓𝑣𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
= 𝑓 𝑣𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
 
There exists a positive externality when the consumers connect to the network. 
This is because the more consumers who get connected, 𝑓 will become higher, 
which again will lead to higher willingness to pay. In other words, a user will 
improve the value of the network for all the other users by joining, since the 
network becomes larger. It is important to note that when the fraction of 
consumers decline, so too will each consumer’s willingness to pay also decline.  
 
In order to find the demand the focus is on the marginal consumer. Assume that 
the marginal consumer has a reservation valuation denoted 𝑣 𝑖 . Her reservation 
value is equal to 𝑣 𝑖 =
𝑝𝑓
𝑓
 , since she is indifferent between buying and not buying 
the service. This means that the consumers with a lower valuation than 𝑣 𝑖  will not 
join the network, whilst those who have a higher valuation than 𝑣 𝑖  will join. As 
mentioned earlier, 𝑣 𝑖  is uniformly distributed, 𝑣 𝑖  ∈  0, 100 , for 𝑓 ∈  0, 1 , which 
means that those who have valuation lower than 𝑣 𝑖  is equal to 
𝑣 𝑖  
100
. The network 
size f is normalized. Therefore, the fraction of the population who has a higher 
valuation than 𝑣 𝑖 , and therefore will buy the service, is: 
𝑓 = 1 −
𝑣 𝑖  
100
 
Substituting 𝑣 𝑖  with 
𝑝𝑓
𝑓
 gives: 
𝑓 = 1 −
𝑝𝑓
100𝑓
 
 
In order to find the inverse demand function facing the monopolist, the equation 
above is solved for 𝑝𝑓  which yields the following result: 
 (1)     𝑝𝑓 = 100𝑓(1 − 𝑓) 
 
To maximize 𝑝𝑓 , differentiate equation (1) with respect to f: 
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𝑑𝑝𝑓
𝑑𝑓
= 100 − 200𝑓 = 0 
⇒ 𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥 =
1
2
 
 
Note that the maximum price, 𝑝𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 25, is for 𝑓 =
1
2
, and that the demand 
curve is symmetric around 𝑓 =
1
2
. 
 
The result in equation (1) expresses the relationship between the monopolist’s 
price for the network access and the fraction f of potential buyers who actually 
hook up to the network, i.e. equation (1) is the demand curve, which can be 
illustrated by the following figure: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Market characterised by network externalities 
(Pepall et al. 2005:617 and own calculations) 
 
As Figure 2 illustrates, the demand curve is dome-shaped which implies that when 
the network is small, the consumers’ willingness to pay is low. As the network 
size increases, the consumers’ willingness to pay becomes higher. The consumers’ 
willingness to pay reaches the turning point of the concave demand function at 
𝑓0 
 
𝑓2 
c 
Demand curve 
Willingness to pay, 𝑓𝑣𝑖 = 𝑝𝑓  
𝑓1 
 
Size of 
network, f 
𝑝𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 25 
1
2
𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥 =
1
2
 
𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 1 𝑓
𝑚  
𝑝𝑓
𝑚  
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1
2
𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥 =
1
2
 and 𝑝𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 25, where the willingness to pay decreases with the 
fraction of the population hooked up to the network. The reason is that when the 
size of the network is large there are already many consumers that have become 
member of the network, so that the remaining are those with lower willingness to 
pay. 
 
For all prices greater than 𝑝𝑓 = 25 no equilibrium with a positive value of f exists. 
For each price 𝑝𝑓  that the monopolist charges, except 𝑝𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥 , there exists two 
possible equilibria for f, one unstable and one stable. The low-fraction equilibrium 
will be unstable. This is because in a low-fraction equilibrium, a small loss of 
consumers will reduce the value of the network for the remaining consumers. 
Eventually, the outcome is that all consumers leave and the network will fail 
(Pepall et al. 2005:618). When the willingness to pay is lower than the price, then 
𝑓 will decrease. The possible equilibrium 𝑓1 is said to be unstable, i.e. “tippy”, 
thus the two arrows going away from the point. The possible equilibrium 𝑓1 can 
be referred to as a “tipping point”, which is a point where demand will either take 
off or the network will fail. The low-fraction equilibria, which are unstable, will 
be the critical mass for the network. If the fraction of users is just a bit larger than 
the critical mass, the network can grow to a high-fraction equilibrium. The points 
𝑓0 and 𝑓2 are said to be stable. If the price is lower than the willingness to pay, the 
fraction of population, 𝑓, joining the network will increase. Consider the effect of 
a small reduction in price or one extra user joining the network starting in the 
possible low-fraction equilibrium 𝑓1. Then the value of the network will increase 
above the reservation price for all consumers within the interval (0, 𝑓2). This will 
hence lead to the establishment of a high-fraction equilibrium 𝑓2. In the possible 
stable equilibrium 𝑓0 the demand will not take off and the network will fail. 
 
This section will analyse the monopolist’s behaviour in the network market. The 
monopolist will maximize profits with respect to the fraction of potential 
consumers connected to the network. To solve for the monopolist’s profit-
maximizing choice, denote equation (1) to the general form such that  
𝑝𝑓 = 𝑟𝑓(1 − 𝑓). This is a new method for solving the model, extended by the 
authors of this thesis.  
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The monopolist’s profit will hence equal: 
𝜋(𝑓) = 𝑝𝑓𝑓 − 𝑐𝑓 
Substituting for the general form of 𝑝𝑓  yields: 
𝜋(𝑓) = 𝑟𝑓2 1 − 𝑓 − 𝑐𝑓 
 
Differentiating with respect to f yields: 
𝑑𝜋 𝑓 
𝑑𝑓
= 2𝑟𝑓 1 − 𝑓 − 𝑟𝑓2 − 𝑐 = 0 
2𝑟𝑓 − 2𝑟𝑓2 − 𝑟𝑓2 − 𝑐 = 0 
−3𝑟𝑓2 + 2𝑟𝑓 − 𝑐 = 0 
 
Since a quadratic equation 𝐴𝑥2 + 𝐵𝑥 + 𝐶 = 0 has the solutions 𝑥 =
−𝐵± 𝐵2−4𝐴𝐶
2𝐴
, 
this yields:  
𝑓𝑚 =
−2𝑟 ±  4𝑟2 − 12𝑟𝑐
−6𝑟
=
−2𝑟 ±  4𝑟2(1 −
3𝑐
𝑟 )
−6𝑟
=
−2𝑟 ± 2𝑟 (1 −
3𝑐
𝑟 )
−6𝑟
 
 
of which the positive root is: 
 (2)     𝑓𝑚 =
1+ 1−
3𝑐
𝑟
3
. 
 
From equation (2) it is possible to find the monopolist’s profit maximizing 
network size f depending on the level of c: 
1.     If 𝑐 = 𝑜  ⇒    𝑓𝑚 =
2
3
 
2.    If 𝑐 > 𝑜  ⇒    𝑓𝑚 <
2
3
 
3.    If 𝑐 =
𝑟
4
   ⇒    𝑓𝑚 =
1
2
    ⇒ 𝜋 𝑓 = 0 
 
Hence,  
1
2
≤ 𝑓𝑚 ≤
2
3
   𝑓𝑜𝑟  
𝑟
4
≥ 𝑐 ≥ 0 
 
Of course, if 𝑐 > 𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥  there will be no network. In case 1 with 𝑐 = 0, the 
monopolist’s profit maximizing choice of network size will be 𝑓𝑚 =
2
3
. As seen 
from the different levels of c, the monopolist’s profit maximizing choice of 
GRA 19002 Master Thesis                                                                          01.09.09  
29 
 
network size will be somewhere between [
1
2
 ,
2
3
], when the marginal network cost, 
c, is positive. This is a novel result, based on the extensions made by the authors 
of this thesis to include a marginal cost c in the model by Pepall et al. (2005). 
 
It is possible to compare the monopolist’s profit maximizing choice of network 
size to the choice of the social planner. The social optimum requires that the 
network is as large as possible at a price equal to marginal cost. From the social 
planner’s point of view, the network will therefore be maximized at point 𝑓2, i.e. 
the point where price equals marginal costs. Hence, the monopolist will not 
choose the socially optimal network size. Comparing the case when marginal 
costs are equal to zero, 𝑐 = 0, the social planner will maximize welfare, resulting 
in a network size of 𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥 . The monopolist will maximize profit and choose the 
network size 𝑓𝑚 =
2
3
. Hence, the monopolist will in case 1 restrict the network 
size to 
2
3
 of what is socially optimal. 
 
3.1.3. Direct and indirect network externalities related to compatibility 
It is possible to distinguish between direct and indirect network externalities. 
Direct network externalities, often found in a physical two-way communications 
network (Rohlfs 1974) can be exemplified from the telecommunication industry. 
Here, there exists a positive relationship between the value of the network for a 
consumer and the number of subscribers of the network. For a software market 
this will imply that a user can easily share files with other users of the same 
software. If you were on the other hand the only user of specific word processing 
software, it would probably be impossible to exchange a document as no one else 
would have the necessary software to open the document file.  
 
For communication networks, the concern for compatibility is whether consumers 
using one firm’s services can contact consumers who use the service of other 
firms. If two firms’ systems are interlinked, i.e. compatible, then the aggregate 
number of consumers in the two systems will comprise the appropriate network. If 
the systems are incompatible then it will be the size of an individual system will 
constitute the proper network measure (Katz and Shapiro 1985). 
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 Indirect network externalities can be explained from the computer industry, as the 
value of a product or a system depend on the complementarity between the 
different components. The combination of these goods or services will complete 
some desired task (Page and Lopatka 1999), and this means that the 
complementarity leads to consumers shopping for systems rather than individual 
products (Shy 2001). Katz and Shapiro (1994) name the above a hardware-
software network and exemplify it by the operative system-market. If there are 
very few that have bought a specific operative system, there will also be few or 
none software developers that wish to write applications for the specific platform. 
The reason is as follows. The demand for a given operative system will depend on 
how many applications that have been developed for that specific operative 
system. However, the demand for applications will depend on how many users 
there are of the specific operative system.  
 
For hardware-software markets, the concern for compatibility is whether software 
produced for use on one brand of hardware may be run on another brand of 
hardware. Two brands of hardware will be compatible if they can use the same 
software (Katz and Shapiro 1985). 
 
3.2. Model of network externality related to compatibility 
 
In this section of the thesis, the authors of this thesis will extend a network model 
by Moen (2008) to include the impact of compatibility. The model by Moen 
(2008) expands the general spatial model of product differentiating, i.e. the 
Hotelling model presented amongst others by Tirole (1988), to include for 
network externalities. The Moen (2008) model examines how network 
externalities can influence the competition, i.e. the prices, in a market. Here, the 
main finding is that network externalities will make demand more price sensitive, 
which again will lead to fiercer competition between the firms. The reason is that 
by reducing the price, the network will become more attractive, which again 
yields more consumers buying the product. When a market is characterised by 
network externalities, it is important for a firm to become large in order for the 
network to be stable, which was shown in section 3.1.2.  
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In the following, the model developed by the authors of this thesis, will link 
network externalities and compatibility. What is new in this model compared to 
Moen’s model (2008) is the aspect of compatibility, which the authors of this 
thesis have included.  The aim is to examine whether compatibility can affect 
competition in a market dominated by network externalities. The model setup is 
relatively similar to the standard Hotelling model (Tirole 1988). 
 
3.2.1. Model setup 
The setup for the network model related to compatibility is as follows. There are 
two companies located at each end point of a line, whilst consumers are spread on 
the line with unit length. It is in other words a duopoly market, with 
heterogeneous consumers who have diverse preferences for different networks 
which the line represents. Assume that the two firms have constant unit costs 𝑐 
and that consumer travel cost is 𝑡 per unit of length. The consumer travel cost is 
distributed as 𝑡 ∈  0,1 . The travel cost can be interpreted as the cost a consumer 
must “pay” for not getting her ideal product/network. The prices 𝑝1 and 𝑝2 are set 
by the firms independently and simultaneously. As mentioned earlier, the model 
aims to link network externalities with the degree of compatibility. Therefore, the 
parameter 𝑛 represents network externalities where the user obtains positive 
utility from belonging to a firm with many customers. What the authors of this 
thesis introduce, compared to the Moen model (2008), is the parameter 𝜏, which 
represents the degree of compatibility with the other product/network. The 
consumers obtain positive utility when the networks are compatible. 𝜏 is specified 
as follows:  𝜏 ∈  0,1 , where 0 specifies complete incompatibility with the other 
network, whilst 1 specifies complete compatibility with the other network. It is 
assumed that 𝜏 is observable for the consumers, and that the consumers are 
rational. In what follows it is also assumed that 𝑛 < 𝑡. 
 
  
The location of the indifferent consumer is denoted 𝑥𝑚 , which will also be the 
market share for firm 1. The market share for firm 2 is denoted 1 − 𝑥𝑚 . The 
distribution of the consumers is 𝑥 ∈  0,1 , where x is the location of a consumer 
measured as the distance from firm 1. Assumptions underlying the model are that 
the market is entirely covered and that the consumers are uniformly distributed 
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along the horizontal line. Graphically, the structure of model can be illustrated by 
the following figure, denoted Figure 3: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Structure of the Hotelling model, the linear city 
(Tirole 1988:97) 
 
Now a consumer with location x will be considered. Her utility of joining firm 1’s 
network is respectively: 
(1)    𝑢1 = 𝑉 − 𝑝1 − 𝑡𝑥 + 𝑛𝑥
𝑚 + 𝜏 1 − 𝑥𝑚  𝑛 
 
The above function states that her utility will increase through the term 𝑛𝑥𝑚  by 
being member of the network 1. Her utility will also increase if firm 1’s network 
is compatible with firm 2’s network through the term 𝜏 1 − 𝑥𝑚  𝑛. Collecting the 
terms yields the following result: 
𝑢1 = 𝑉 − 𝑝1 − 𝑡𝑥 + 𝑛𝑥
𝑚 +  𝜏𝑛 − 𝜏𝑛𝑥𝑚  
(2)   𝑢1 = 𝑉 − 𝑝1 + 𝜏𝑛 − 𝑡𝑥 + 𝑛(1 − 𝜏)𝑥
𝑚  
 
Similarly, the utility function for a consumer in network 2 is respectively:  
𝑢2 = 𝑉 − 𝑝2 − 𝑡 1 − 𝑥 + 𝑛 1 − 𝑥
𝑚  + 𝜏𝑛𝑥𝑚  
 
As seen for network 1, the consumer’s utility in network 2 will increase due to the 
network externality, through the term 𝑛 1 − 𝑥𝑚  , and also by network 2 being 
compatible with network 1, which is represented through the term 𝜏𝑥𝑚𝑛. 
Collecting the terms yields the following result: 
𝑢2 = 𝑉 − 𝑝2 − 𝑡 + 𝑡𝑥 + 𝑛 − 𝑛𝑥
𝑚 + 𝜏𝑛𝑥𝑚  
(3)   𝑢2 = 𝑉 − 𝑝2 − 𝑡 + 𝑛 + 𝑡𝑥 − 𝑛(1 − 𝜏)𝑥
𝑚  
 
Firm 1 Firm 2 
 
0 1 
 
𝑥𝑚  
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The consumer that is indifferent between joining network 1 or network 2, i.e. the 
indifferent consumer 𝑥𝑚 , can be found by setting the equation (2) and (3) equal to 
each other and adjusting for consumer 𝑥𝑚 : 
 
𝑉 − 𝑝1 + 𝜏𝑛 − 𝑡𝑥
𝑚 + 𝑛(1 − 𝜏)𝑥𝑚 = 𝑉 − 𝑝2 − 𝑡 + 𝑛 + 𝑡𝑥
𝑚 − 𝑛(1 − 𝜏)𝑥𝑚  
 
The equation above can be rewritten in order to find an expression for the 
indifferent consumer, 𝑥𝑚 : 
 
−𝑡𝑥𝑚 + 𝑛 1 − 𝜏 𝑥𝑚 − 𝑡𝑥𝑚 + 𝑛 1 − 𝜏 𝑥𝑚 = 𝑝1 − 𝑝2 − 𝜏𝑛 − 𝑡 + 𝑛 
−2𝑡𝑥𝑚 + 2𝑛 1 − 𝜏 𝑥𝑚 = 𝑝1 − 𝑝2 − 𝑡 + 𝑛 1 − 𝜏  
2𝑡𝑥𝑚 − 2𝑛 1 − 𝜏 𝑥𝑚 = 𝑝2 − 𝑝1 + 𝑡 − 𝑛 1 − 𝜏  
𝑥𝑚 =
𝑝2 − 𝑝1 + 𝑡 − 𝑛 1 − 𝜏 
2𝑡 − 2𝑛 1 − 𝜏 
 
𝑥𝑚 =
𝑝2 − 𝑝1
2(𝑡 − 𝑛 1 − 𝜏 )
+
𝑡 − 𝑛 1 − 𝜏 
2(𝑡 − 𝑛 1 − 𝜏 )
 
 
(4)     𝑥𝑚 =
1
2
+
𝑝2−𝑝1
2(𝑡−𝑛 1−𝜏 )
 
 
From equation (4) is it possible to observe that the market share will depend on 
the price difference 𝑝2 − 𝑝1, transportation cost 𝑡 and the product of network 
externalities and degree of compatibility 𝑛 1 − 𝜏 . 
 
Replace (𝑡 − 𝑛 1 − 𝜏 ) with 𝑡 ′  in order to obtain a similar result as in the 
standard Hotelling model: 
(5)     𝑥𝑚 =
1
2
+
𝑝2−𝑝1
2𝑡 ′
 
 
The above equation (5) represents the location of the indifferent consumer. In 
order to find the firms reaction curves and thereafter the equilibrium prices, firm 1 
will be considered. Firm 1’s profit is given by: 
(6)     𝜋1 = (𝑝 − 𝑐)𝑥
𝑚  
 
Substitute 𝑥𝑚  with the expression found in equation (5), in order to get the 
following expression:  
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(7)     𝜋1 = (𝑝 − 𝑐)  
1
2
+
𝑝2−𝑝1
2𝑡 ′
  
 
The above expression in equation (7) is identical to the expression in the standard 
Hotelling model (Moen 2008), however the 𝑡 is now replaced by 𝑡 ′ . The firms 
maximize profit with respect to price: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥  𝜋1 =  𝑝 − 𝑐  
1
2
+
𝑝2 − 𝑝1
2𝑡′
   𝑤. 𝑟. 𝑡 𝑝1 
 
𝜕𝜋1
𝜕𝑝1
=
𝜕[ 𝑝1 − 𝑐  
1
2 +
𝑝2 − 𝑝1
2𝑡′  ]
𝜕𝑝1
= 0 
1
2
+
𝑝2 − 𝑝1
2𝑡′
−
𝑝1 − 𝑐
2𝑡′
= 0 
1
2
+
𝑝2 − 2𝑝1 + 𝑐
2𝑡 ′
= 0 
2𝑝1
2𝑡′
=
1
2
+
𝑐 + 𝑝2
2𝑡′
 
𝑝1 =
𝑐 + 𝑝2 + 𝑡
′
2
 
 
The following result is hence obtained for the reaction functions for firm 1 and 2 
respectively: 
(8) 
𝑝1 =
𝑐 + 𝑝2 + 𝑡
′
2
 
𝑝2 =
𝑐 + 𝑝1 + 𝑡
′
2
 
 
In order to find the equilibrium prices, the above expression for 𝑝2 is substituted 
into reaction function for firm 1: 
𝑝1 =
𝑐 + 𝑡′
2
+
1
2
 
𝑐 + 𝑝1 + 𝑡
′
2
  
𝑝1 −
𝑝1
4
=
𝑐 + 𝑡′
2
+
𝑐 + 𝑡′
4
 
3𝑝1
4
=
3𝑐 + 3𝑡′
4
 
𝑝1 = 𝑐 + 𝑡
′  
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By symmetry, the following result is obtained for the equilibrium prices: 
(9)    𝑝1 = 𝑝2 = 𝑐 + 𝑡
′ = 𝑐 + 𝑡 − 𝑛 1 − 𝜏  
 
The parameter 𝜏, which is what the authors of this thesis have introduced, was 
specified to be between 0 and 1, where 0 represents complete incompatibility and 
1 represents complete compatibility. Assume that the two firms offer two different 
software programmes, for instance document software. Whether compatibility 
between the two document software will affect the prices consumers will face will 
now be examined. Therefore, the two polar cases of complete incompatibility and 
complete compatibility will be examined. 
 
3.2.2. Incompatibility 
With complete incompatibility, i.e. 𝜏 is equal to 0, the result obtained in equation 
(9) will be equal to 𝑝1 = 𝑝2 = 𝑐 + 𝑡 − 𝑛. This means that network externalities 
combined with incompatibility will make the competition fiercer and the 
equilibrium prices will be reduced. With incompatible systems, the firms will 
have an incentive to decrease its price in order to attract as many consumers as 
possible along the horizontal line because of the network externality. In the 
situation of complete incompatibility, being big becomes important, as the 
network becomes more valuable the more consumers that are hooked up to the 
network. 
 
3.2.3. Compatibility 
With complete compatibility, i.e. 𝜏 = 1, the result obtained in equation (9) will be 
equal to 𝑝1 = 𝑝2 = 𝑐 + 𝑡. If the two firms offer compatible software programmes, 
the network effect will not matter for which programme the consumer uses, as she 
can exchange documents with every user of the two document software. 
Consumers’ buying decision will not be affected by the network externality, as 
both software programmes “speak the same language”. Therefore, complete 
compatibility will cancel out the effect of network externality. Hence, only the 
travel cost t will matter. The firms will then have the possibility to charge higher 
prices compared to the situation of complete incompatibility, i.e. 𝜏 = 0, and will 
in the case of complete compatibility obtain increased profits (Shy 2001). These 
results for the network model related to compatibility are new and interesting 
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economic implications to the model by Moen (2008) and the Hotelling model, 
which were proven by the authors of this thesis. 
 
Shy (2001) argues that in these circumstances, compatibility may be seen as 
anticompetitive. An example is from the banking industry where banks can 
increase their profits by making their automatic-teller machines (ATMs) 
compatible with the ATMs of its competitors. The reason is as follows. In the 
situation of incompatibility, the relative utility each user gain from each machine 
will depend on the relative network size and the price difference between the two 
competitors. Under incompatibility the firm will reduce its price in order to attract 
as many consumers as possible to their network. However, under compatibility, 
the price competition will be relaxed since the network size of each firm will 
become irrelevant to the consumers’ purchase choice. An economic effect under 
compatibility is that equilibrium prices will become higher (Shy 2001).  
 
3.2.4. The effect on consumer surplus 
In order to examine whether a consumer will be better off in the case of 
compatibility or not, the consumer surplus for a consumer can be calculated as 
follows: 
𝐶𝑆 = 𝑈1 𝑥 = 𝑢1 − 𝑝1 
where  𝑢1 = 𝑉 + 𝜏𝑛 − 𝑡𝑥
𝑚 + 𝑛 1 − 𝜏 𝑥𝑚 , and 𝑝1 =  𝑐 + 𝑡 − 𝑛 1 − 𝜏  as seen in 
equation (9). 
 
Assume that 𝑥𝑚 =
1
2
 when considering the average consumer. This yields the 
following result for the consumer surplus: 
𝐶𝑆 = 𝑈1 𝑥 = 𝑢1 − 𝑝1 = 𝑉 + 𝜏𝑛 −
1
2
𝑡 +
𝑛 1 − 𝜏 
2
−  𝑐 − 𝑡 + 𝑛 1 − 𝜏   
 
Solving the above equation yields: 
𝐶𝑆 = 𝑈1 𝑥 = 𝑉 −
1
2
𝑡 − 𝑐 − 𝑡 + 𝑛 +
𝑛 1 − 𝜏 
2
 
(10)    𝐶𝑆 = 𝑈1 𝑥 = 𝑉 −
3
2
𝑡 − 𝑐 +
3
2
𝑛 −
𝑛𝜏
2
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Equation (10) is the expression for the consumer surplus and it decreases with 𝜏. 
In the presence of network externalities and when the two networks are 
compatible, i.e. 𝜏 = 1, equation (10) shows that the consumer is worse off in this 
situation compared to the situation of complete incompatibility, i.e. 𝜏 = 1. It is 
also possible to examine the effect on consumer surplus due to a small change in 
compatibility: 
𝜕𝑈1(𝑥)
𝜕𝜏
= −
𝑛
2
 
 
Hence, any consumer is worse off with an increase in compatibility, and consumer 
surplus is reduced with a product of the network externality. 
 
The network model related to compatibility show that the price effect dominates 
the network benefits, thereby resulting in reduced consumer surplus under 
complete compatibility. However, a possible limitation of the model may be that it 
cannot consider an effect on total output because of its horizontal linear 
specification. The effect on total output will therefore be considered in the model 
by Katz and Shapiro (1985) in section 3.3. The increase in price and the reduction 
in consumer surplus under complete compatibility may imply that the firms have 
too strong incentives for achieving compatibility. It is therefore possible that the 
firms undertake too high costs related to achieving compatibility compared to 
what might be socially optimal. 
 
3.2.5. Conclusion  
The model of network externalities related to compatibility, derived by the authors 
of this thesis, showed that if two firms offer complete compatible networks, the 
prices will increase. Having compatible networks will “cancel out” the network 
externalities, since a firm does not have to reduce its price in order to attract 
consumers to his network. The consumers’ buying decision will not be affected by 
network externalities since they will be able to communicate with both compatible 
networks. With complete incompatible networks, the network externalities will 
lead to reduced prices. The prices will be reduced by the competing firms in order 
to attract consumers. With compatible networks the effect for consumer surplus 
was shown to be negative, and the firms may have too strong incentives for 
achieving compatibility. These results for the network model related to 
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compatibility are new and interesting economic implications to the model by 
Moen (2008) and the Hotelling model. The results were proven by the authors of 
this thesis when extending the Moen (2008) model to include a parameter for 
compatibility. 
 
3.3. Model of compatibility 
 
The following analysis will be in an oligopolistic setting. A simple and static 
model of oligopoly developed by Katz and Shapiro (1985) is used to analyse 
markets characterised by network externalities. Hence, the assumptions for the 
model are that network externalities are present in the market where a given 
amount of producers are present, the consumers’ utility function gives rise to the 
demand function, and the equilibrium is a fulfilled expectations Cournot 
equilibrium. First, the model will be derived by considering the consumers and the 
firms. The equilibrium is characterised by rational consumers, where their 
expectations about the network are fulfilled, hence the equilibrium is fulfilled 
expectations equilibrium. Network externalities will yield demand-side economies 
of scale, which will depend on consumer expectations. Secondly, the welfare will 
be analysed by studying both the consumer and producer surplus. Thirdly, the 
compatibility decision will be discussed by considering the equilibrium 
characterisation. Regarding compatibility, important issues are whether 
compatibility is socially desirable and whether the private incentives for 
compatibility are consistent with the social incentive. In other words, do firms 
have sufficient incentives to produce compatible goods or services (Park 
2005:257). The central findings when viewing all firms together are that total 
output increases with compatibility and that the firms’ joint incentives for product 
compatibility might be lower than the social incentives. Thereafter, the divergence 
between the social and private incentives to achieve compatibility will be 
discussed. Hereunder, a parallel will be drawn to an oligopoly quality model 
derived by the authors of this thesis. Finally, a conclusion based on the previous 
results will be provided. 
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3.3.1. Consumers 
The compatibility model is a partial equilibrium oligopoly model where 
consumers act to maximize their utility. It is assumed that a consumer will buy 
either one or no unit of any brand (Katz and Shapiro 1985:426). The surplus a 
consumer obtains from consuming a unit of good will depend on the number of 
other consumers who join the network related with that product. It is the expected 
network sizes that will be the basis for consumers’ purchase decisions; therefore, 
it is assumed that consumers must make their purchase decisions before the actual 
network sizes are known. Networks are assumed to be homogeneous, meaning 
that all consumers will view two networks of equal size as perfect substitutes. 
Further, it is assumed that consumers are heterogeneous in their basic willingness 
to pay for the product, but homogeneous in their valuation of the network utility. 
 
The timing of the model is the following. In the first stage, the consumers form 
expectations about the size of the network. In the second stage, taking the 
consumers’ expectations as given, the firms play an output game which will 
generate a set of prices. Subsequently, consumers decide whether to purchase a 
good by comparing their reservation prices, which is based on their network size 
expectations, with the prices set by the n firms. A requirement is imposed; in 
equilibrium consumers’ expectations will be fulfilled. 
 
The number of users that a consumer expects firm i to have is denoted 𝑥𝑖
𝑒 , and the 
consumers’ prediction of the network size which is associated with firm i is 
denoted 𝑦𝑖
𝑒 . The expectation of network size is identical across all consumers. 
When products are incompatible, each products’ market size will equal its own 
network 𝑦𝑖
𝑒  = 𝑥𝑖
𝑒 . When m firms’ products are compatible, for example product 1 
through m, there will be a single network for these brands (Katz and Shapiro 
1985:426): 
𝑦𝑖
𝑒 =  𝑥𝑗
𝑒
𝑚
𝑗=1
  for 𝑖 =  1, 2, . . . . ,𝑚 
 
For a product with expected network size 𝑦𝑒 , a consumer of type r has a 
willingness to pay r + v(𝑦𝑒). The variable r can be interpreted as the consumer’s 
basic willingness to pay for the good, and the term v(y) is the value the consumer 
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attaches to the network externality when the number of subscribers is y (Katz and 
Shapiro 1985:426). The function 𝑣(∙) is increasing. The basic willingness to pay 
for the good, r, varies over consumers and is assumed to be uniformly distributed 
between minus infinity and A with density one, resulting in a linear demand 
function. The network benefit is specified as an increasing function of the network 
size of the compatible products (Park 2005:256). Let 𝑝𝑖  denote the price charged 
for brand i. A consumer of type r will choose the brand for which her utility is 
largest. The r consumer’s utility function for a product i in the presence of 
network externalities is defined as the sum of a stand-alone benefit, i.e. 𝑟 −  𝑝𝑖 , 
and the network benefit, i.e. 𝑣 𝑦𝑖
𝑒 ,  since consumers derive benefit from the 
product itself and the network size of the product (Park 2005:256): 
 
(1)    𝑈𝑟𝑖 = 𝑟 −  𝑝𝑖 + 𝑣 𝑦𝑖
𝑒  
 
3.3.2. Firms 
The firms compete in a Cournot fashion, hence they choose output 
simultaneously. Given homogeneous products, two firms i and j will both have 
positive sales if and only if: 
 
(2)   𝑝𝑖 − 𝑣 𝑦𝑖
𝑒 = 𝑝𝑗 − 𝑣 𝑦𝑗
𝑒 ≡ 𝜙,  
 
where 𝑝𝑖 − 𝑣 𝑦𝑖
𝑒  is the expected hedonic price of brand i and 𝜙 denotes the 
common value of the expected hedonic price. If for example 𝑝𝑖 − 𝑣 𝑦𝑖
𝑒 > 𝑝𝑗 −
𝑣 𝑦𝑗
𝑒  firm j would lose all its customers to firm i. This is an essential equation in 
the model since it shows that it is the expected network that affects output, not the 
actual network. If the actual number of consumers is increased with one, this will 
have no effect on the equilibrium because consumers’ expectations about the 
network will be unchanged. In market equilibrium the fact that expectations do 
not increase may be a reason for why firms do not want to increase output. 
According to equation (2), the hedonic prices must equal when several firms have 
positive sales. For a given value of 𝜙, only the consumers with a basic willingness 
to pay for the good larger than the hedonic price, i.e. 𝑟 ≥ 𝜙, will buy the good. 
There will be 𝐴 − 𝜙 such consumers in the market. Total output is denoted by z 
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such that firms totally sell 𝑧 ≡  𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1  units. The prices must then be set so that 
𝐴 − 𝜙 = 𝑧 or: 
 
(3)   𝐴 + 𝑣 𝑦𝑖
𝑒 − 𝑝𝑖 = 𝑧     for all i such that 𝑥𝑖 > 0.  
 
Firm i’s inverse demand function is hence: 
 
(4)   𝑝𝑖 = 𝐴 + 𝑣 𝑦𝑖
𝑒 − 𝑧.  
 
The price that firm i will receive will depend on the expected size of its network, 
𝑦𝑖
𝑒 , and on the total unit sales of the n firms, z. 
 
The two types of costs in the model are cost of production and cost of achieving 
compatibility. To simplify, it is assumed that the cost of production, consisting of 
a fixed cost and a variable cost, is zero. The cost of achieving compatibility, 
which is assumed to be fixed, may consist of development and design costs for a 
compatible product, negotiation costs for selecting a standard, and the cost of 
introducing a new, compatible product. Hence the marginal cost of achieving 
compatibility is assumed to be zero. When all networks are incompatible, i.e. 𝑦𝑖
𝑒  = 
𝑥𝑖
𝑒 , the profit of firm i equals: 
 
(5)   𝜋𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖(𝐴 − 𝑧 + 𝑣 𝑥𝑖
𝑒 )  
 
given sales of 𝑥𝑖  and total output z. When all n products are compatible it is such 
that 𝑦𝑖
𝑒  =  𝑥𝑗
𝑒𝑛
𝑗=1 ≡ 𝑧
𝑒  for all i. Given total output z and firm i’s sales equal 𝑥𝑖 , 
firm i’s gross profit is: 
 
(6)   𝜋𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖(𝐴 − 𝑧 + 𝑣 𝑧
𝑒 ) 
 
The fixed cost of compatibility incurred by firm i, 𝐹𝑖 , must be subtracted from the 
gross profits in order to obtain profits net of fixed costs of compatibility (Katz and 
Shapiro 1985:427). 
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3.3.3. Fulfilled expectations equilibrium 
The equilibrium of the model can be characterised as fulfilled expectations 
Cournot equilibrium. Hereunder, the output level of each firm is chosen under the 
assumption that consumers’ expectations of the network sizes are given, and that 
the actual output level of the other firms is fixed. The firms maximize profit with 
respect to quantity 𝑥𝑖 :  
 
Max  𝜋𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖 𝐴 − 𝑧 + 𝑣 𝑦𝑖
𝑒    with respect to 𝑥𝑖  
 
Differentiate profit with respect to quantity in order to obtain the first order 
condition: 
 
𝑑𝜋𝑖
𝑑𝑥𝑖
=
𝑑[𝑥𝑖(𝐴 − 𝑧 + 𝑣 𝑦𝑖
𝑒 )]
𝑑𝑥𝑖
= 0 
 
 When solving the first order conditions of profit maximization of the Cournot 
game, this yields a vector of the equilibrium sales levels (𝑥1
∗, 𝑥2
∗,… . , 𝑥𝑛
∗) that must 
satisfy: 
𝐴 − 𝑧 + 𝑣 𝑦𝑖
𝑒 = 0 
𝐴 − 𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
+ 𝑣 𝑦𝑖
𝑒 = 0 
 
(7)  𝑥𝑖
∗ = 𝐴 + 𝑣 𝑦𝑖
𝑒 −  𝑥𝑗
∗𝑛
𝑗=1 =  𝐴 + 𝑛𝑣 𝑦𝑖
𝑒 −  𝑣(  𝑦𝑗
𝑒) /(𝑛 + 1)𝑗≠𝑖              
 
for 𝑖 = 1, 2,… ,𝑛. 
 
It is possible to see that quantity, 𝑥𝑖
∗, equals price, 𝑝𝑖 , since the right hand side of 
the first part of equation (7) equals the price (Katz and Shapiro 1985:428). This 
equation represents a firm’s equilibrium output level. 
 
3.3.4. Welfare 
As seen in the equation (7), in equilibrium firm i’s output level will be equal to 
the price that firm receives. Therefore, the i’th firm’s profit in equilibrium will be 
equal to 𝜋𝑖 = (𝑥𝑖
∗)2.  
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It is the actual size of the network that determines the surplus a consumer obtains 
from joining the network, and in equilibrium the actual network size will equal 
that network’s expected size. Substituting equation (4) into equation (1) yields: 
 
𝑈𝑟𝑖 = 𝑟 + 𝑣 𝑦𝑖
𝑒 − 𝑝𝑖  
= 𝑟 + 𝑣 𝑦𝑖
𝑒 − 𝐴 − 𝑣 𝑦𝑖
𝑒 + 𝑧 
= 𝑟 + 𝑧 − 𝐴 
 
Hence, when market output is z, a type r consumer will only join a network if the 
utility is non-negative, hence 𝑟 + 𝑧 − 𝐴 ≥ 0, i.e. 𝑟 > 𝐴 − 𝑧, or otherwise stay out 
of the market and derive no surplus. Consumers’ expected surplus, CS, can be 
obtained by integrating over all consumers who do enter the market: 
 
(8)   CS: 𝑆 𝑧 =   𝜌 + 𝑧 − 𝐴 𝑑𝜌 =
𝑧2
2
𝐴
𝐴−𝑧
 
 
In the fulfilled expectations equilibrium, the expected and actual consumers’ 
surplus will be equal. Equation (8) show that consumer surplus increases with the 
total output level z. 
 
The social welfare, W, will consist of the sum of producers’ and consumers’ 
surplus. Welfare is hence given by the following expression in the fulfilled 
expectations Cournot equilibrium (Katz and Shapiro 1985:429): 
 
(9) W: 𝑊 𝑥1,… , 𝑥𝑛 = 𝜋 𝑥1,…  , 𝑥𝑛 + 𝑆 𝑥1+. . . +𝑥𝑛 =  𝑥𝑖
2𝑛
𝑖=1 +
𝑧2
2
 
 
Hence, the social welfare also increases with the total output level z. 
 
3.3.5. Equilibrium characterisation 
Following, the structure of fulfilled expectations equilibrium for compatible and 
partial compatible products will be studied. 
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First, the case of complete compatibility will be examined. Since the model is in 
an oligopolistic setting, it is supposed that any two products are compatible with 
one another. Then there is a single network of expected size 𝑧𝑒 =  𝑥𝑖
𝑒𝑛
𝑖=1 , and for 
all i we have that 𝑦𝑖
𝑒 = 𝑧𝑒 . The unique Cournot equilibrium that corresponds to a 
set of expectations (7) becomes: 
 
(10)   𝑥𝑖
∗ =
𝐴+𝑣 𝑧𝑒 
𝑛+1
   for 𝑖 = 1, 2,… ,𝑛.  
 
By imposing the fulfilled expectations requirement, 𝑧𝑒 = 𝑥1+. . . +𝑥𝑛
∗ , and adding 
equation (10) up over all i, the following fulfilled expectations equilibrium value 
of total output is obtained: 
 
(11)   𝑧𝑐 =  
𝑛
𝑛+1
 (𝐴 + 𝑣 𝑧𝑐 ) 
 
When the products are compatible, the fulfilled expectations equilibrium value of 
total output is denoted 𝑧𝑐 . The equation has a unique solution and this unique 
compatible-products equilibrium is symmetric: 𝑥𝑖
𝑐 =
𝑧𝑖
𝑐
𝑛
 for all i. Hence, one may 
state that when all products are mutually compatible, there is a unique Fulfilled 
Expectations Cournot Equilibrium (FECE) which is symmetric (Katz and Shapiro 
1985:429). The market equilibrium with complete compatibility can be illustrated 
by the following figure: 
 
Figure 4: Market equilibrium with complete compatibility  
(Katz and Shapiro 1985:429) 
 
 𝑛 + 1
𝑛
𝑧 
𝐴 + 𝑣(𝑧) 
𝐴 
z 
Total output 
𝑧𝐶  
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As the number of firms n increases, the fulfilled expectations equilibrium under 
compatibility, 𝑧𝑐 =  
𝑛
𝑛+1
 (𝐴 + 𝑣 𝑧𝑐 ), converges to the perfectly competitive 
equilibrium; 𝑧𝑐  approaches 𝐴 + 𝑣 𝑧𝑐  and the hedonic price, 𝐴 + 𝑣 𝑧𝑐 − 𝑧𝑐 , 
approaches a zero marginal cost. 
 
Secondly, the case of partial compatibility, i.e. less than complete compatibility, 
will be examined. If there are more than two firms, the degree of product 
compatibility may lie in between complete industry-wide compatibility and 
complete incompatibility, so that at least two products are not compatible with 
each other. The pattern of compatibility is assumed to be characterised by the set 
of compatibility groups, 𝐺𝑗  𝑗 = 1,… , 𝐽, where all of the brands within a group are 
mutually compatible with each other, but incompatible with any brand which is 
not member of that group. Hence, if firm i is in group 𝐺𝑗 , the network size equals 
 
𝑦𝑖 =  𝑥𝑘 ≡ 𝑦
𝑗
𝑘∈𝐺𝑗
 
 
A firm i in group j maximizes profit 𝜋𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖(𝐴 − 𝑧 + 𝑣 𝑦
𝑗  ) such that the first 
order condition is 𝑥𝑖 = 𝐴 − 𝑧 + 𝑣(𝑦
𝑗 ). Consequently, the same level of output 𝑥𝑗  
will be chosen by all firms in a given group. The number of firms in compatibility 
group j is denoted by 𝑚𝑗 . Therefore, in equilibrium for all 𝑥𝑗 > 0 (Katz and 
Shapiro 1995:432) it is such that: 
 
(12)   𝑥𝑗 = 𝐴 − 𝑧 + 𝑣(𝑚𝑗𝑥𝑗 ). 
 
From firm i’s first order condition, by summing up over all firms and rearranging 
the rational expectations equilibrium under incomplete compatibility yields (Park 
2005:258): 
 
(13)   𝑧𝐼 =  
𝑛𝐴+ 𝑣(𝑦𝑖)
𝑛+1
  
 
Based on the two equilibria results from equation (11) and (13), Katz and Shapiro 
(1985:432) give the following proposition (Proposition 1): “The level of total 
output is greater under industry-wide compatibility than in any equilibrium with 
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less than complete compatibility”. The proof is the following; For all firms with 
positive levels of output it was observed that 𝑥𝑖 = 𝐴 + 𝑣 𝑦𝑖 − 𝑧. This gave 
 𝑛 + 1 𝑧 = 𝑛𝐴 +  𝑣(𝑦𝑖) when adding up over all firms and rearranging, as 
shown in Figure 4. Under complete compatibility the network size for firm i 
equals the total output, 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑧, for all firms. Under incomplete compatibility it is 
such that 𝑦𝑖 < 𝑧 for at least one firm. Complete and incomplete compatibility can 
thus be compared in the following figure, Figure 5. Here, the curve 𝑛𝐴 + 𝑛𝑣 𝑧  
lies above the curve 𝑛𝐴 +  𝑣(𝑦𝑖) which determines the 𝑦𝑖’s under incomplete 
compatibility: 
 
 
Figure 5: Complete vs. Incomplete compatibility 
(Katz and Shapiro 1985:433) 
  
Since 𝑧 > 𝑦𝑖  for at least one firm, we obtain 𝑧
𝐶 > 𝑧𝐼 such that the equilibrium 
level of output is greater under industry-wide compatibility than under incomplete 
compatibility. 
 
The equation of a firm’s equilibrium output level, 𝑥𝑖
∗, indicates that under 
complete compatibility the equilibrium price will be higher than the price of 
symmetric equilibrium under incomplete compatibility. Hence, under 
compatibility price competition is reduced. This result was also shown in the 
network model related to compatibility in section 3.2. However, in the 
compatibility model consumer surplus will be larger under complete 
compatibility. This is because consumer surplus increases with the total output 
level, which is found to be larger under complete compatibility. In general, 
 (n+1)z 
 
𝑛𝐴 + 𝑛𝑣(𝑧) 
𝑛𝐴 +  𝑣(𝑦𝑖) 
𝑛𝐴 
z 
Total output 
𝑧𝐼 𝑧𝐶  
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compatibility between competing technologies reduces the competition in the 
product market, but may increase consumers’ network benefits. In the 
compatibility model by Katz and Shapiro (1985), the positive effects from the 
increased network benefits dominate the negative effects of the increased price, 
and thus compatibility will increase consumer surplus (Park 2005:259). Hence, 
the compatibility model implies that compatibility will increase surplus for 
consumers and increase prices. 
 
3.3.6. The private and social incentives for compatibility 
So far, the compatibility model by Katz and Shapiro (1985) has treated product 
compatibility as exogenous. In markets where network externalities are important, 
the compatibility of products will be the result of the firms’ explicit decisions. The 
following analysis will examine incentives for achieving compatibility with 
standards as a mechanism for achieving this, related to whether side payments 
amongst firms are possible or not. Firms and the social planner’s incentives for 
achieving compatibility will be studied, in addition to whether firms have 
sufficient incentives for achieving compatibility. 
 
When analysing the private incentives for compatibility, each firm’s change in 
profit, i.e. ∆𝜋𝑖 = 𝜋𝑖
𝐶 − 𝜋𝑖
𝐼 , and the change in firms’ joint profits, i.e. ∆𝜋 =
 ∆𝜋𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 , will be studied and compared to the cost of compatibility. The change in 
consumers’ surplus is denoted ∆𝐶𝑆 = 𝐶𝑆𝐶 − 𝐶𝑆𝐼, and the social incentives for 
compatibility are given by the difference in social surplus under compatibility and 
less than complete compatibility, i.e. ∆𝑊 = 𝑊𝐶 −𝑊𝐼  (Katz and Shapiro 
1985:435). In the next subsection the divergence between the private and social 
incentives for compatibility will be discussed. 
 
Private incentives are given by the change in joint profits ∆𝜋. The social incentive 
will be determined by the changes in social welfare, consisting of the sum of the 
changes in industry-wide profits and the change in consumer surplus; ∆𝑊 = ∆𝜋 +
∆𝐶𝑆. Therefore, the social and private incentives will differ when the move to 
compatibility changes the level of consumers’ surplus. Since consumers’ expected 
surplus equal 𝑆 𝑧 =
𝑍2
2
, consumers’ surplus will increase only if output increases. 
The proposition that the level of total output is greater under industry-wide 
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compatibility than in any equilibrium with less than complete compatibility 
(Proposition 1), show that output and hence consumers’ surplus will increase with 
the move to complete compatibility. Thus, if the sum of the change in joint profits 
is positive, ∆𝜋 > 0, then the change in social welfare is positive, ∆𝑊 = ∆𝜋 +
∆𝐶𝑆 > 0. Therefore, another proposition (Proposition 2) will be that when 
compatibility costs are purely fixed costs, any move to complete compatibility 
that increase industry profits is socially beneficial (Katz and Shapiro 1985:435). 
Hence, firms’ compatibility incentives will not be socially excessive.  
 
Actually, firms’ incentives for achieving compatibility might be inadequate with 
purely fixed costs of compatibility; ∆𝐶𝑆 > 0 and therefore ∆𝑊 > ∆𝜋. If the total 
costs of achieving compatibility in the industry, denoted F, is larger than the sum 
of the change in total profits across all firms, but lower than the change in social 
surplus, this is denoted ∆𝜋 < 𝐹 < ∆𝑊. Then the private firms will not achieve a 
socially desirable level of compatibility, and the private incentives will hence be 
inadequate. The reason is that firms are unable to appropriate all the benefits 
resulting from compatibility since consumer surplus increases (Katz and Shapiro 
1985:435). An analogous result from economic theory is a monopolist’s 
inadequate incentives for providing a socially desirable product in the presence of 
fixed costs, when the monopolist is not able to perfectly price discriminate. 
 
A method for achieving compatibility is the joint adoption of a product standard. 
It is therefore interesting to examine the incentives for compatibility under the 
adoption of an industry standard. Hereunder, standardization involves that a given 
set of firms must cooperate in order to make their products compatible with one 
another. It is assumed that all of the firms in the specific set must decide to make 
the products compatible, and any firm can veto the move to compatibility. 
Assume that a set of side payments can be constructed such that all firms’ profits 
will increase individually if and only if compatibility will increase joint profits. In 
other words, that the change in profits for the firms within the set exceeds the total 
compatibility costs.  
 
When side payments are not possible, the standard will be adopted if and only if 
all firms joining the standard benefit from this standard setting. Assuming that 
side payments are infeasible and that firm i incurs cost 𝐹𝑖  to adopt the standard 
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(achieving compatibility), then adoption will occur if and only if firm i’s change 
in profits is larger than the cost of adoption, ∆𝜋𝑖 > 𝐹𝑖  for all adopters of the 
standard. Hence, if firms are not able to make side payments to one another, 
combined with having a product standard as the method for achieving 
compatibility, the products of a given set of firms will only be made compatible if 
all of these firms would earn greater profits as a result.  
 
Assume that it is possible to make side payments among the firms achieving 
compatibility through the adoption of a standard, for example through licensing 
fees or compensation for compatibility expenses. Hereunder, an adequate 
condition for achieving compatibility is that the total profit of the firms who 
achieve compatible products increases. Hence, when the compatibility method is a 
standard, allowing for cost sharing through side payments will increase the 
possibility for the firms to choose compatibility. Therefore, the previous 
proposition, Proposition 2, can be strengthened by stating that the private 
standardization rule is more stringent when cost sharing is not possible than when 
it is possible. The set of cases in which the firms fail to adopt a standard that is 
socially beneficial is therefore larger when it is not possible to make side 
payments. Any privately profitable industry-wide standard is still socially 
desirable (Katz and Shapiro 1985:436). 
 
3.3.7. Distortions related to the compatibility decision 
This section will discuss the divergence between the social and private incentives 
for achieving compatibility, proven in the previous section. Two sources of 
distortion arise because when firms make their compatibility decision, they ignore 
the effects this will have on both the level of consumers’ surplus and the profits of 
other firms.  
 
First, the effect on consumers’ surplus will be considered. A seen in the previous 
section, the firms’ incentives might be inadequate when the move to compatibility 
increases consumers’ surplus. Contrary, the firms’ incentives might be excessive 
when the move to compatibility decreases consumers’ surplus, i.e. ∆𝐶𝑆 < 0 and 
therefore ∆𝑊 < ∆𝜋 . The change in consumers’ surplus can be divided into two 
components. The first component is the change that arises due to the shift in the 
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total output level, and the second component is the change that occurs when the 
marginal consumer values the network externality differently than the average 
consumer. The following paragraphs will discuss these two components further.  
 
Regarding the first component, the level of consumers’ surplus will increase with 
the level of total output since 𝑆 𝑧 =
𝑧2
2
. If the assumption that the move to 
compatibility has no impact on marginal costs is relaxed, output may be lower 
under complete compatibility than under less than complete compatibility. For 
example is it possible that the adoption of an industry standard may require 
redesign of some or all of the products, which might lead to changes in the 
variable costs of production. Previously in the compatibility model it was assumed 
that the marginal cost of production was zero. Unlike the fixed cost, changes in 
marginal costs will affect the equilibrium output level. Assuming a marginal 
production cost c, the firm i’s profit function 𝜋𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖(𝐴 − 𝑧 + 𝑣 𝑧
𝑒 − 𝑐) will 
depend on c, so that changes in c will affect the equilibrium. In particular, if 
marginal costs increases sufficiently relative to the network externalities, 
complete compatibility will yield lower total output than under incompatibility. 
Hereunder, because of the lower total output, consumers’ surplus will fall as a 
result of the move to complete compatibility and as ∆𝜋 > ∆𝑊 the firms’ joint 
incentives are excessive (Katz and Shapiro 1985:438). 
 
Turning to the second component, the consumer surplus also depends on the 
relationship between the marginal and average buyer’s valuations of the good. In 
the compatibility model the network externality is equally valued by all 
consumers. Therefore, when compatibility is achieved, all consumers’ valuations 
of the good will increase by the same amount. However, the consumer surplus 
will be larger the lower the marginal consumer’s valuation is relative to the 
average consumer’s valuation. Unlike the assumption in the compatibility model, 
more generally, consumers’ valuations of the network externality may differ. If 
the marginal buyer values the network externality more, then the move to 
compatibility will increase her willingness to pay for the good by more than the 
increase for the average buyer. Then, for a given level of output, the firms may 
increase the price by more than the increase in the average buyer’s willingness to 
pay. As a result, consumers’ surplus will be reduced. Also, the total private 
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incentives for achieving compatibility are likely to be higher than the social 
planner’s incentive, ∆𝜋 > ∆𝑊, and thereby excessive. This is because the firms 
consider the marginal consumer’s valuation in the profit maximization, whereas 
the social planner considers the average consumer’s valuation. The effect will go 
in the other direction in the case when the network externality is smaller for the 
marginal buyer (Katz and Shapiro 1985:438). The relationship between the 
average and marginal buyer’s valuation will be elaborated further in an oligopoly 
quality model, developed by the authors of this thesis, in the section 3.3.8. 
 
The divergence between the social and private incentives for achieving 
compatibility is also due to another source of distortion. This distortion arises 
because when firms make their compatibility decision they ignore the effect this 
will have on the profits of other firms. If it is not possible to make side payments 
for achieving compatibility, it is the change in firms’ individual level of profit that 
will motivate the decision to achieve compatibility. The compatibility model 
assumed a symmetric equilibrium. However, given an asymmetric equilibrium the 
change in profits may vary from positive to negative for different firms. Then a 
larger firm may lose market share to a smaller rival firm due to standardization. 
The relative changes in firms’ profit depend on their relative changes in market 
shares and revenues when achieving compatibility. If one group of firms increase 
their market share and profits at the expense of others, this group will be more 
inclined to achieve compatibility. In addition, the relative changes in firms’ profit 
also depend on the relative costs of achieving compatibility. If the costs of 
achieving compatibility would be larger for some firms than for others, a free-
rider problem could arise that would bias the firms away from achieving 
compatibility. 
 
3.3.8. Parallel to oligopoly quality model 
It is possible to draw a parallel from standardization to firms’ choice of quality 
since achieving compatibility through standardization can be interpreted as a 
quality improvement for consumers. Therefore, the authors of this thesis will now 
make modifications to the monopolistic analysis of quality by Pepall et al. (2005), 
by expanding the quality model to an oligopolistic setting. Another new element 
to this model is the welfare analysis derived by the authors of this thesis. 
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Assume that two oligopoly firms produce two identical goods for which they 
choose the price p and the quality z. The inverse demand function facing both 
firms is specified as:  
 
𝑝 = 𝑃 𝑞1, 𝑞2, 𝑧 = 𝑧(𝜃 − 𝑞1 − 𝑞2) 
 
This implies that the market equilibrium price will depend on how much the firms 
produce, 𝑞1 and 𝑞2, and also on the quality of these units, z. Quality is desirable 
since p increases with z. Assume that 𝑄 = 𝑞1 + 𝑞2 where Q is the sum of each 
firm’s quantity. Let 𝐶(𝑞, 𝑧) denote each firm’s cost function for producing 𝑞𝑖  
units of the good with quality z, and assume it is identical for both firms. It is 
assumed that 𝐶(𝑞, 𝑧)  increases with z such that: 
 
𝐶 𝑞, 𝑧 = 𝛼𝑧2 
 
The cost function shows that the marginal cost of production is zero, whereas the 
marginal cost of quality is equal to 𝐶𝑧 𝑞, 𝑧 = 𝛼𝑧. Since the cost function is 
identical for both firms, the total cost of producing Q units with quality z is equal 
to 2𝛼𝑧2. Since the two firms are symmetric, it is assumed that the market 
equilibrium will be symmetric; 𝑞1 = 𝑞2 and 𝑧1 = 𝑧2. 
 
First, the choice of quantity and quality by the oligopolies will be considered in a 
Cournot setting with two firms. To find the oligopolies profit maximizing level of 
quantity 𝑞𝑖  and quality z, both oligopoly firms maximizes profit with respect to 
quantity and quality, taking into account the output level produced by the other 
oligopoly firm: 
 
Max  𝜋𝑖 𝑞1,𝑞2 , 𝑧 = 𝑃 𝑞1,𝑞2, 𝑧 𝑞𝑖 − 𝐶(𝑞, 𝑧)  with respect to 𝑞𝑖  and z. 
 
The profit function for firm 1 equals: 
 
𝜋1 𝑞1, 𝑞2, 𝑧 = 𝑃 𝑞1, 𝑞2, 𝑧 𝑞1 − 𝐶(𝑞, 𝑧) 
𝜋1 𝑞1, 𝑞2, 𝑧 =  𝑧 𝜃 − 𝑞1 − 𝑞2 𝑞1 − 𝛼𝑧
2 
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Differentiating firm 1’s profit function with respect to 𝑞1 gives firm 1’s reaction 
function: 
𝜕𝜋(𝑞1, 𝑞2, 𝑧)
𝜕𝑞1
= 𝑧 𝜃 − 𝑞1 − 𝑞2 − 𝑧𝑞1 = 0 
𝑞1 =
𝜃 − 𝑞2
2
 
And symmetrically for firm 2: 
𝑞2 =
𝜃 − 𝑞1
2
 
 
Substituting for 𝑞2 into firm 1’s reaction function and solving for 𝑞1 yields firm 
1’s equilibrium output level: 
𝑞1
∗ =
𝜃
2
−
1
2
 
𝜃 − 𝑞1
2
  
𝑞1 =
𝜃
2
−
𝜃 − 𝑞1
4
 
3
4
𝑞1 =
𝜃
4
 
(1)     𝑞1
∗ =
𝜃
3
 
 
And equivalently for firm 2: 
(2)     𝑞2
∗ =
𝜃
3
 
 
Hence, the oligopolies choice of quantity 𝑞𝑖  is independent of the choice of 
quality z and equal to 𝑞1
∗ = 𝑞2
∗ =
𝜃
3
. The oligopolies choice of quantity is a new 
result found by the authors of this thesis. From equation (1) and (2) it is possible 
to find the total output level equal to 𝑄 = 𝑞1 + 𝑞2 =
2𝜃
3
. Inserting 𝑞1
∗ = 𝑞2
∗ =
𝜃
3
 
into the demand function yields the equilibrium price: 
𝑝 = 𝑃 𝑞1, 𝑞2, 𝑧 = 𝑧(𝜃 −
𝜃
3
−
𝜃
3
) 
𝑝∗ =
𝑧𝜃
3
 
 
It is possible to solve for the oligopolies’ profit maximizing level of quality z* 
through the following computations applying the Envelope theorem (Sydsæter et 
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al. 2005). If the quality level z is changed, this will increase the price. Therefore, 
to find how much the price increases with when increasing the quality with ∆𝑧, 
you need to consider the marginal consumer’s willingness to pay:  
𝑝𝑚 = 𝑧 𝜃 − 𝑞1 − 𝑞2 = 𝑧  𝜃 −
2𝜃
3
 =
𝑧𝜃
3
 
 
Applying the following mathematical calculation rule  
𝑓 𝑥 + ∆ − 𝑓(𝑥) ≈ 𝑓 ′(𝑥) ∙ ∆ (Sydsæter et al. 2005), the increase in income due to 
a small increase in quality will equal: 
∆𝜋 = 𝜋 𝑧 + ∆𝑧 − 𝜋(𝑧) ≈ 𝜋′ (𝑧) ∙ ∆𝑧 
∆𝜋 ≈ ∆𝑧 ∙
𝜃
3
∙
𝜃
3
= ∆𝑧 ∙
𝜃2
9
 
 
Equivalently, it is possible to find the increase in costs due to a small increase in 
quality: 
∆𝐶 = 𝐶 𝑧 + ∆𝑧 − 𝐶(𝑧) ≈ 𝐶′(𝑧) ∙ ∆𝑧 
∆𝐶 ≈ ∆𝑧 ∙ 2𝛼𝑧 
 
In optimum it is such that the increase in income should equal the increase in 
costs, so that: 
𝜋′  𝑧 ∙ ∆𝑧 = 𝐶′(𝑧) ∙ ∆𝑧 
(3)     ∆𝑧 ∙
𝜃2
9
= ∆𝑧 ∙ 2𝛼𝑧 
 
Solving equation (3) for z yields the oligopolies’ profit maximizing choice of 
quality z*, equal to: 
 
(4)     𝑧∗ =
𝜃2
18𝛼
 
 
 
Secondly, the oligopolies profit maximizing level of quality will be compared 
with the social planner’s choice of quality z, given the Cournot quantity level 
𝑄 = 𝑞1 + 𝑞2 =
2𝜃
3
. The following welfare analysis, developed by the authors of 
this thesis, is a new extension to the monopolistic model of quality by Pepall et al. 
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(2005). The inverse demand function facing the oligopoly firms can be illustrated 
in the following figure: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Social surplus in an oligopoly quality model given Cournot quantity 
(own calculations) 
 
The social surplus given the Cournot quantity level  
2
3
𝜃 is shown in hatched area in Figure 6, and equals consumer surplus (CS) and 
producer surplus (𝜋). This social surplus W can mathematically be expressed as: 
 
𝑊 = 𝐶𝑆 + 𝜋 =
𝜃2𝑧
2
−  
1
3
𝜃 ∙
𝑧𝜃
3
∙
1
2
  
𝑊 =
𝜃2𝑧
2
−
𝜃2𝑧
18
 
𝑊 = 𝜃2𝑧  
1
2
−
1
18
  
𝑊 = 𝜃2𝑧  
4
9
  
 
In order to find the socially optimal quality level, 𝑧𝑆
∗, given the Cournot quantity 
level 
2
3
𝜃, the social planner maximizes the difference between the social surplus 
W and the total costs: 
 
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑊 − 2𝐶 𝑞, 𝑧   with respect to 𝑧 
 
 
𝑧𝜃 
p 
𝑄 = 𝑞1 + 𝑞2 
𝜃 
 
2
3
𝜃 
 
𝑝 =
𝑧𝜃
3
 
𝑃 𝑞1, 𝑞2, 𝑧 = 𝑧(𝜃 − 𝑞1 − 𝑞2) 
 CS 
𝜋 
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𝜕 𝑊 − 2𝐶 𝑞, 𝑧   
𝜕𝑧
=
𝜕  𝜃2𝑧  
4
9 − 2𝛼𝑧
2  
𝜕𝑧
= 0 
 
𝜕 𝑊 − 2𝐶 𝑞, 𝑧   
𝜕𝑧
=
4𝜃2
9
− 4𝛼𝑧 = 0 
4𝛼𝑧 =
4𝜃2
9
 
(5)      𝑧𝑆
∗ =
𝜃2
9𝛼
 
 
Hence, the socially optimal quality level 𝑧𝑆
∗, given the Cournot quantity level  
2
3
𝜃, is equal to 
𝜃2
9𝛼
. 
 
By comparing the oligopolies profit maximizing choice of quality z* in equation 
(4) with the socially optimal quality level 𝑧𝑆
∗ in equation (5), it is possible to see 
that the oligopolies choice of quality is lower than what is socially optimal, given 
the Cournot quantity level: 
 
𝑧∗ =
𝜃2
18𝛼
< 𝑧𝑆
∗ =
𝜃2
9𝛼
 
 
The oligopoly quality model derived by the authors of this thesis hence shows that 
the oligopolies will choose a too low level of quality to what is socially optimal. 
This is because the oligopolies will balance the benefits in increased income 
generated from better quality, z, against the increased costs this quality 
improvement imposes. They are thereby not able to extract the full social value of 
the increased quality. The social planner is concerned about the average marginal 
buyer’s valuation for quality, whereas the oligopolies are concerned about the 
“marginal marginal” valuation for quality, where the first marginal refers to the 
consumer and the second to quality. The reason is that the social planner is 
concerned with the effect of an increase in quality on all buyers, whereas the 
oligopolies consider the effect of an increase on the marginal buyer. Hence, the 
incentive to provide quality is related to the marginal willingness to pay for 
quality, for the marginal consumer in the case of the oligopolies and for the 
average consumer in the case of a social planner (Tirole 1988). 
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With this in regard, it is possible to draw a parallel from oligopolies choice of 
quality, shown in the model derived by the authors of this thesis, to oligopolies 
choice of compatibility, derived in the compatibility model. Since achieving 
compatibility through standardization can be interpreted as a quality improvement 
for consumers, the oligopoly quality model shows that firms have too low 
incentives for providing compatibility. The reason is that the firms are not able to 
extract the full social benefit of increased quality since consumers extract some of 
this benefit. The result is too low market incentives for providing quality or 
achieving compatibility. One solution may be to increase the de jure 
standardization. The equilibrium result of the oligopolies’ choice of quantity and 
quality, and the results from the welfare analysis of the oligopoly quality model, 
are new and interesting findings developed by the authors of this thesis. 
 
3.3.9. Conclusion 
To conclude, the mechanism underlying the model by Katz and Shapiro (1985) is 
the importance of consumers’ expectations in markets where network externalities 
are present. The equilibrium is characterised by rational consumers where their 
expectations about the network are fulfilled; therefore the equilibrium is fulfilled 
expectations Cournot equilibrium. The main findings are that network 
externalities will result in demand-side economies of scale which will depend on 
consumer expectations. Total output is found to be larger under complete 
compatibility than under less than complete compatibility. The positive effects 
from the increased network benefits are found to dominate the negative effects of 
the increased price, and thus compatibility will increase consumer surplus. Hence, 
compatibility leads to higher welfare, and if marginal costs of production remain 
unchanged, compatibility will also increase firms’ total profit due to the 
expectations formations.  Finally, it was found that firms’ incentives for achieving 
compatibility might be inadequate compared to the social incentive. This result 
was supported by the oligopoly quality model, derived by the authors of this 
thesis, where it was found that oligopolies would provide too low quality to what 
is socially optimal. 
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3.4. Benefits and costs of compatibility 
 
By examining the economic consequences of achieving compatibility, the social 
impacts of a standard can be further analysed. The benefits and costs will be 
viewed from the consumer, producer and social planner’s perspective. The 
arguments will both be based on the results found in the previously presented 
models and on additional literature. 
 
3.4.1. Benefits related to compatibility 
There are both benefits and costs associated with achieving compatibility. First, 
the benefits will be discussed with the basis in the previous presented models and 
supplementary literature. In the model by Katz and Shapiro (1985) a benefit from 
achieving compatibility is found to be that total output is larger under complete 
compatibility than under less than complete compatibility. This effect on the 
market was illustrated in a market equilibrium figure, Figure 4, in the Katz and 
Shapiro model. Consumer surplus also increases with compatibility as total output 
increased. In this model compatibility will hence lead to greater welfare, and if it 
does not involve increasing marginal costs, firms’ profits will also increase. The 
reason for the increase in profits is due to relaxed price competition. 
 
There are further benefits from achieving compatibility. Farrell and Saloner 
(1986) list three main sources for these benefits. First is the interchangeability of 
complementary products such as computer software. For hardware/software 
networks the benefit for consumers occurs as firms supplying software 
components gain access to a larger market. This may lead to increased number of 
entrants and greater variety for software components. The second source is the 
ease of communication. For communication networks, the benefit is attributed to 
the fact that users can communicate with any other user. The third source is cost 
savings, since standardization can lead to mass production. This was discussed in 
section 2.2.1. 
 
Another benefit is the protection consumers’ gain in avoiding stranding. 
Consumers will not fear being stranded when deciding to purchase from a 
particular supplier if products are compatible (Shapiro 2000:8). Moreover, Katz 
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and Shapiro (1994) describe the circumstances where two firms are choosing 
whether to make their competing systems compatible. For hardware/software 
systems, they state that ultimately the benefits of achieving compatibility are 
appropriated to lower production costs. With compatible components in different 
systems there may be increased opportunities of gain through economies of scale, 
learning effects and technological spillovers in component development and 
production. For communications networks, in such a case, compatibility may 
expand the size of each network to the total size of both. This may increase the 
benefits of gross consumption for a consumer who is initially part of only one of 
the networks. It also evades the cost of having to hold duplicate equipment to 
participate in both the networks in order to reach all consumers (Katz and Shapiro 
1994:109).  
 
Page and Lopatka (1999) also proclaim the benefit of expanded network size. 
Consumers of compatible physical networks may obtain direct external benefits 
from communicating with more users, in addition to cost savings of owning two 
sets of hardware. Consumers of virtual networks may gain indirect benefits of an 
increased network, hereunder a larger range of mixable components, in addition to 
reduced risk of stranding with outdated technology. The benefits of larger scale 
may be gained by producers (Page and Lopatka 1999:964). 
 
3.4.2. Costs related to compatibility 
Conversely, there are also costs related to compatibility. One cost associated with 
compatibility is increased prices, which was shown in the network externality 
model related to compatibility from section 3.2 and in the model of compatibility 
from section 3.3. The price competition will be relaxed under compatibility, as it 
will be less important for firms to attract consumers in order to become large in 
the network market. Consumers’ purchase choice will therefore be unaffected by 
the network size of each firm. An economic effect under compatibility is hence 
that equilibrium prices will become higher. Both the compatibility model by Katz 
and Shapiro (1985) and the network externality model related to compatibility 
developed by the authors of this thesis demonstrate that compatibility will lead to 
higher prices. However, in the network externality model related to compatibility 
the economic impact for consumers will be negative, whereas the welfare effect 
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from achieving compatibility in the model by Katz and Shapiro is positive due to 
the increase in market output and increase in consumer surplus. 
 
In the compatibility model, the move to compatibility increased total output given 
that marginal cost did not increase. If marginal costs will increase sufficiently 
relative to the network externalities, complete compatibility will yield a lower 
total output than under incompatibility. In this case, because of a lower total 
output, consumers’ surplus will then fall as a result of the move to complete 
compatibility, and the firms’ joint incentives for achieving compatibility will be 
excessive (Katz and Shapiro 1985). 
 
The oligopoly quality model derived by the authors of this thesis also showed that 
the oligopolies will choose a too low level of quality to what is socially optimal. 
Since achieving compatibility through standardization can be interpreted as a 
quality improvement for consumers, the oligopoly quality model shows that firms 
have too low incentives for providing compatibility. The reason is that the firms 
are not able to extract the full social benefit of the increased quality, since 
consumers extract some of this benefit. The result is too low market incentives for 
providing quality or achieving compatibility. 
 
Another cost related to compatibility is that standardization can lead to “lock-in” 
to an inferior standard, and the reluctance to switch to a new and perhaps superior 
standard. A well known example is that the typewriter keyboard standard 
“QWERTY” which is in use today, is believed to be inferior to the alternative 
keyboard “DVORAK”. The explanation for this persistence for the “QWERTY” 
standard might be that the benefits from compatibility exceed the costs of 
switching standards (Farrel and Saloner 1985). This example illustrates that an 
industry may be “trapped” in an obsolete or inferior standard, even when there 
might be a superior alternative available.  This inefficiency is called excess 
inertia, i.e. the consumers wait to adopt. 
   
Excess inertia is a cost associated with standardization that is related to the 
demand side in markets characterised by network externalities. Another cost is 
excess momentum which means that consumers rush to an inferior technology in 
fear of getting stranded. Consumers have interdependent utility functions being in 
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a market characterised by network externalities as mentioned in section 3.1.1. 
Hence, consumers must anticipate which technology that will be widely used by 
the other users. Being so, coordination problems in the market may be a result. 
Assuming that different users have conflicting preferences about which 
technology to coordinate on, the two potential inefficiencies are excess inertia and 
excess momentum.   
 
Excess inertia and excess momentum will be further described in the following 
section. In the following, consider two users (i = 1, 2) who has the choice of either 
to stick to an old technology or adopting a new one. Assume also that the two 
technologies are incompatible, which means that the size of the network is firm-
specific. u(q) denotes a user’s utility when holding on to the old technology, 
whilst the size of the network for the old technology is q (where q = 1 or 2). 
Similarly, adopting the new technology gives users utility v(q) when technology 
has network size q. Having positive network externalities means that 𝑢(2) > 𝑢(1) 
and 𝑣(2) > 𝑣(1). Also assumed that both users prefer to coordinate their 
decision, whatever this decision is, such that 𝑢(2) > 𝑣 1  and 𝑣(2) > 𝑢(1). The 
consumer thinks it is better to do what the others do, than to be left alone. The two 
users will choose simultaneously whether to switch to the new technology, which 
gives the two pure-strategy equilibria. Equilibria are either when both users stick 
with the old technology, or when both users adopt the new technology (Tirole 
1988:406).  
 
The possibilities for excess inertia and excess momentum can be illustrated as 
follows. If 𝑣(2) > 𝑢(2) and yet both users stick to the old technology, this means 
that the market is inefficient, i.e. excess inertia is present. Coordinating, i.e. 
through perfect symmetric information, on the new technology would be Pareto 
superior. However, each user is afraid of moving alone. If 𝑣(2) < 𝑢(2) and yet 
both switch to the new technology due to fear of getting stranded with the old 
technology, this will lead to excess momentum. A means to avoid excess inertia 
could be one user adopting the new technology, and persuading the others to 
switch, for instance through setting market standards (Tirole 1988:406). 
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4. Open standards 
 
It is difficult to categorise standards as “open” or “closed” because there is no 
common accepted definition of an open standards and because standards may in 
practice encompass both elements. Further, there are multiple dimensions of 
openness, which may have different impacts on different economic actors in 
different contexts. The definition of an open standard may also be confused with 
the consequences of openness (West 2004:3). With this part of the thesis, the aim 
is to present definitions of open standards, as well as to discuss the openness of 
standards related to its different stakeholders, in addition to analysing the 
economic impacts of open standards. This part can therefore facilitate the analysis 
of whether OOXML can be considered as an open standard, and thereby provide 
another foundation for the analysis of the economic impacts of this standard. 
 
Krechmer (2005) gives a motivation for open standards by stating that an open 
society which utilizes communication systems requires open standards. In 
particular are government agencies increasingly aware of providing all 
stakeholders with easy access to electronic documents, which does not require the 
purchase of a particular software program to view or edit the documents. Open 
standards may hence be a key enabler for interoperability or compatibility since it 
facilitates transfer of information available to everyone (Ditch 2007). 
 
4.1. Definition 
 
The European Union’s Valoris Report gives the following definition of an open 
standard: “The minimum requirements for an open standard are that the document 
format is completely described in publicly accessible documents, that this 
description may be distributed freely and that the document format may be 
implemented in programs without restrictions, royalty-fees, and with no legal 
bindings.” (Valoris 2003:20). Another definition of open standards is related to 
intellectual property rights (IPR). West (2004:7) defines “open” for a standard to 
mean the rights of the standard that are made available to economic actors other 
than the sponsor. Both specification and implementation of a standard may have 
associated intellectual property rights. Owners can expect to profit through 
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licensing or sale of its products if they are subject to strong legal and technical 
IPRs. It is the standard sponsors’ default ownership of such rights that, according 
to West (2004), enables the distinction between open and closed standards. Hence, 
if there are no such rights and knowledge is distributed equally to all economic 
actors, then all standards would be equal and inherently “open”. 
 
4.2. Openness of standards related to stakeholders’ perspectives 
 
Standardization consists of both the standard creation process, as well as the 
implementation of the standard by implementers, and the use of the 
implementations of the standard by users. Hence, it is necessary to consider open 
standards from the three stakeholders’ perspectives; creators’, implementers’ and 
users’ perspectives, which will be the purpose of this section. The perspectives of 
implementers and users of open standards are as essential as the perspective of the 
creators of open standards (Krechmer 2005:29). Further, the economic motivation 
for each stakeholder will differ. The creation of standards can be motivated by 
potential market development and control issues, standard implementation can be 
motivated by production- and distribution-cost efficiencies, whereas the use of 
implemented standards can be motivated by the consumer’s potential efficiency 
improvement, appropriated by the standard on the user. 
 
To present a complete view of open standards ten specific requirements by 
creators, implementers and users, according to Krechmer (2005), will be 
presented. Some requirements will be common for some of the three stakeholders. 
Creators’, i.e. standardization-setting organisations (SSO), view of open standards 
is a standard development program which amongst others features balance, open 
meeting (Open Meeting), due process (Due Process) and consensus (Consensus). 
In contrast from user’s and implementer’s view, most SSOs do not advocate 
making standards irrevocably available on a royalty-free basis, which is the 
highest level of open IPR.  
 
Implementers’ view of open standards is a standard which does not impose any 
costs for them (Open IPR and Open Documents), serves the market they wish 
(Open World), one which does not make their prior implementations obsolete 
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(Open Interface), does not exclude further innovation (Open Change), and lastly 
is a standard which does not favour a competitor (Open Use). These requirements 
will ensure implementers the ability to compete on an equal basis.  
 
A user of an implementation of a standard would regard a standard as open if the 
following four aspects related to the standardization process are met. First, when 
local legal requirements in all necessary locations are met and operated by the 
standard (Open World, Open Use and Open Documents), and secondly when new 
implementations considered necessary by the user are compatible with previous 
implementations (Open Interface and Open Use). Further, through the availability 
of multiple interworking implementations of the standard from different sources 
(Open Interface and Open Use), and lastly if the implementation is supported over 
user desired service life (Ongoing Support) (Krechmer 2005). When a user 
purchase a product, the user typically obtains the right to use the standard 
incorporated in the product and its complements. Rights such as price and terms 
of usage may be specified by the implementer. Therefore, the openness of the 
standard itself, related to the development process and formal specification, is 
relevant mostly if limited competition at the implementation level might reduce 
consumer benefit (West 2007:105). 
 
The requirements for open standards when considering creators, implementers and 
users can be summarized in Table 1:  
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Requirements Creator Implementer User 
Open Meetings X   
Consensus X   
Due Process X   
Open World X X X 
Open IPRs X X X 
Open Change X X X 
Open Documents  X X 
Open Interface  X X 
Open Use  X X 
Ongoing Support   X 
 
Table 1: Requirements for open standards related to stakeholders 
(Krechmer 2005:33) 
 
Consequently, it is possible to see that the requirements for open standards of the 
different stakeholders sometimes are similar and sometimes differ. Following, the 
ten requirements will be described more thoroughly.  
 
Open Meeting implies that the standardization development process is open for all 
to participate. However, there has been a significant decline in user participation 
in standard development as technology has become more complex. Economy is a 
barrier for open meetings, for example when SSOs require membership before 
attendance. Consensus implies that all interests related to the standardization 
process are discussed, and that an agreement is found without domination from a 
single stakeholder group. Commonly, consensus translates into no single 
stakeholder group holding the majority of an SSO membership. If a decision 
requires consensus or a supermajority, it might increase the influence of a 
minority of the participants or reduce a powerful vendor’s ability to dominate the 
process (West 2007). Due Process involves asking members to vote secretly on an 
issue, i.e. balloting, and an appeal process which could be used to find resolutions. 
Generally, it requires that written views and objections of all participants are 
promptly considered.   
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Open World implies having the same standard for the same capability worldwide, 
and is endorsed by the World Trade Organization (WTO) to avoid technical trade 
barriers. However, this requirement can be politically controversial regarding both 
religious beliefs and imbalance in costs between countries who implement 
standards and countries that do not. Consequently, the coordination of standards 
through world standards is supported, but not considered a requirement, by most 
acknowledged SSOs. One example is the five different and incompatible wireless 
technologies of the third-generation (3G) cellular standards, which initially will 
operate in different geographical areas. Possibly in time, users will request 
worldwide compatibility of the 3G standards. The open world-requirement is 
supported by the three recognized worldwide SSOs; ISO, IEC and ITU, however 
nations are reluctant to giving up their national standardization rights. Worldwide 
standards are usually created under consortia standardization. 
 
Open IPR is related to how holders of intellectual property rights (IPR) enclosed 
in standards make the IPR available. Several recognized SSOs and consortia 
interpret open IPR to mean that IPRs must be made available for implementation 
on reasonable and non-discriminatory (RAND) terms by the holders of IPRs. 
Open Change implies that all changes done to existing standards will be presented 
and agreed upon in a forum which supports the previous mentioned requirements. 
The ability to control changes to standards is an influential and important tool in 
controlling interfaces when system updates are distributed over the Internet and 
stored in computer memory. To ensure that interfaces remain open, it is necessary 
that all changes are presented, evaluated and approved in a committee which 
supports the first five mentioned requirements for open standards. 
 
The requirement Open Documents implies that committee documents and 
completed standards are readily available. This requirement is necessary for a 
stakeholder to be able to have access to any documents from an SSO. 
Standardization documents consist of work-in-progress documents and complete 
standard documents. It is important for standard implementers to have access to 
work-in-progress standard documents, so that specific technical decisions are 
comprehensible, in addition to access to complete standard documents. Most 
formal SSO’s standard documents are available at a cost.  Open Interface is a 
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technical concept related to compatibility standards used between programmable 
systems (Krechmer 2005:40). Compatibility to previous systems, i.e. backward 
compatibility, and future systems, i.e. forward compatibility, that share the same 
interface is supported by the open interface requirement. Open Use involves the 
need for users to be assured about the implementation they use, implying known 
reliable standardized implementations. Open use covers all parameters needed to 
be identified related to a standard’s accuracy, safety and proper use. The last 
requirement, Ongoing Support, involves the support of standards until the interest 
from users end, rather than when the interest of implementers decline (Krechmer 
2005). 
 
As a contrast to the ideal requirements, according to West (2007), real world 
standards are rarely fully open or completely closed; rather, they consist of some 
sort of mix of both elements. Two problems related to the open versus closed 
terminology may therefore be mentioned. The first problem West indicates is that 
it seems difficult to agree about a consistent classification across all stakeholders. 
This argument may be supported by the different stakeholders’ requirements for 
open standards presented above. Further, another problem related to the 
terminology is that openness is represented by more than one dimension. If 
different stakeholders were to give these dimensions varied importance in rating, 
and there is perceptual error in rating each standard along a continuum, then 
attempts to identify the most open standard may produce divergent ratings across 
a range of stakeholders (West 2007:92). 
 
4.3. Must open be free? 
 
Another discussion related to the openness of standards is whether open standards 
must be free. The increasing impact of patents and patent royalties is an important 
issue related to cost, seeing that royalty-based business models for standards such 
as MP3 and GSM has had great success (West 2007).  The impact of IPRs on a 
standard is to a great extent determined by the IPR policies applied when creating 
the standard. IPR policies may constrain sponsors and other agents’ ability to 
profit from incorporating their own IPR in a standard. 
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A possible approach SSOs may take is to disregard potential patent issues when 
writing the standard, leaving it for the market to handle when implementing the 
standard. A more aggressive approach is mandatory disclosure, which requires 
standardization participants to reveal any possibly related IPR during the 
specification process. The two royalty approaches most commonly used for 
patents related to standards are reasonable and non-discriminatory (RAND) terms 
and royalty free. RAND can be royalty free, however in practice it allows standard 
sponsors, i.e. patent holders, to create an exclusive club whose members through 
cross-licensing generally have a superior cost structure to non-members. RAND is 
considered by some to be the minimum acceptable policy for effective open 
standardization. The other royalty approach, the royalty-free approach, is 
preferred by Open Source developers who consider patent royalties not to be open 
enough (West 2007:106). 
 
4.4. Economics of open standards 
 
A model by Grindley (1995) related to the openness of standards will now be 
presented in order to study the economic impacts of open standards. As mentioned 
in the definition of standards in section 2.1, standards may be characterised by a 
firm’s control over the standard. It is a firm’s control decision that will determine 
the market control the firm is likely to have over the standard. 
 
Assume that a firm may decide whether to develop a standard or adopt another 
firm’s standard. Further, assume that the firm which holds the technology a 
standard is based upon may decide whether to keep the standard proprietary or 
make it open, through standardization in a standardization-setting organisation 
(SSO). The firm’s standardization decision may therefore be characterised as a 
twofold decision that covers both the leadership of the standard, i.e. whether the 
firm develops its own standard or adopts another standard, and the access to the 
standard, i.e. whether the standard the firm supports is proprietary or open. 
 
The firm’s standardization decision thereby will yield four options for a firm. The 
first option is “Sponsor/Defend”, which is related to developing a proprietary 
standard and restricting its use by competitors by charging significant licence fees. 
GRA 19002 Master Thesis                                                                          01.09.09  
69 
 
The option “Give Away” concerns encouraging competitors to use an open 
standard developed by the firm, without imposing any restrictions. “License in” is 
an option regarding the adoption of a proprietary standard controlled by another 
competing firm. Finally, “Clone” is the option to adopt an open standard, without 
restrictions. These options can be presented in the following matrix: 
 
Proprietary Open
Lead (develop) Sponsor/Defend "Give Away"
Follow (adopt) License in Clone
ACCESS
LEADERSHIP
 
 
Figure 7: The firm’s standardization decision 
(Grindley 1995:30) 
 
Related to the Office Open XML case, it is the two options related to 
“Leader/Proprietary” and “Leader/Open” that are interesting to study when 
considering Microsoft’s market dominance in the document software market. 
 
4.4.1. “Leader/Proprietary” 
Assume that a firm controls the technology the market standard is based upon and 
that this is a proprietary standard. Likely positive benefits for a firm which holds 
the proprietary standard is high market share and high profit. This is because if the 
firm succeeds in establishing a proprietary standard in the market, it can for 
example charge licence fees from other firms. Furthermore, in the case of network 
goods, it has previously been shown that the market tends to converge to a single 
standard, so the firm will hence enjoy a high market share. The firm may thereby 
obtain monopoly control of the market and obtain monopoly profit (Grindley 
1995:36). A firm that controls a technology that becomes established as a standard 
can obtain a very profitable market position. Examples are IBM’s historical 
dominance of the mainframe computer industry, Microsoft’s dominance in 
operating systems and Intel microprocessors’ dominance in the current personal 
computer industry (Besen and Farrell 1994:119). 
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4.4.2. “Leader/Open” 
Assume that the market standard is based upon the firm’s technology, but now 
this is an open standard. Potential positive benefit for a leader of open standards is 
greater likelihood of acceptance, since standardization for example by a SSO will 
lead to broad support from other agents in the market. The standard is usually 
easier to establish because of wider support from other manufacturers and users. 
Another positive benefit for a leader of open standards is an increased market. 
With open standards, firms may create compatible products and hence increase 
the total output in the market. The result of larger output in the case of achieved 
compatibility was shown in the model of compatibility standards by Katz and 
Shapiro (1985). This will benefit the consumers in the market and be socially 
beneficial. 
 
Network goods may constitute a network of complementary products, for instance 
a primary and complementary product. It can be advantageous for a producer to 
make previously proprietary formats open, if the increase in profit from a 
proprietary complementary product can offset any profit that would have been 
made from the primary product, had it not been converted to an open standard. 
Thus, the motivation for opening previously closed formats may be particularly 
strong if the product is lagging behind another leader and making few profits. 
Especially if the producer sees a possibility that if the freely available open 
standard becomes the dominant market standard, the profitability of the 
complementary segment will increase (Lerner and Tirole 2005). 
 
4.4.3. Static game model of a standard contest 
The firm’s standardization decision will depend on the firm’s chances of winning 
a standards war against competing standards. The firm’s strategy for leading or 
following will depend on the relation between its own and other firms’ payoffs 
under the different outcomes. This standard contest will now be analysed in a 
static game model, where each firm’s strategic choices will affect the strategic 
choices of its competitors. Although a common standard is socially beneficial, the 
differences in firms’ payoffs may give rise to a conflict (Grindley 1995:33).  
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Assume that two firms have to decide whether to stick to their individual 
technology or switch to the other firm’s technology. The two players are Firm A 
and Firm B. Both firms can choose between leading, and hence setting the market 
standard, i.e. “Lead”, or adopt the other firm’s technology and standard, i.e. 
“Follow”. The payoff each firm receives will depend on what choice the rival firm 
makes, and can be presented in a two-by-two payoff matrix. In each sell the 
payoff of each firm is indicated as (Firm A payoff , Firm B payoff). 
 
Assume that compatibility is important to achieve through adoption of the same 
industry standard, for example that there would be little market demand unless 
firms agree on a common standard or that a standards battle would decrease a 
large proportion of potential profits. This can be illustrated in a “battle of the 
sexes” game. Here, the important outcome is that players agree to consistent 
strategies, i.e. one firm leads and the other follows, rather than fight. The payoffs 
for two competing firms, Firm A and Firm B, are listed according to whether they 
try to lead or follow (all payoffs in millions of dollars): 
 
  
Firm B 
 
  
LEAD FOLLOW 
 
Firm A 
LEAD ( 3 , 3 ) ( 6 , 4 ) 
 FOLLOW ( 4 , 6 ) ( 0 , 0 ) 
 
      
Figure 8: Payoffs in “battle of the sexes” game 
(Grindley 1995:33) 
 
If the two firms agree to one firm’s standard, the total payoff for the industry is 
$10m. Then the firm that leads will receive $6m and the firm that follows will 
receive $4. With a leadership contest, i.e. both firms lead, the total payoff is only 
$6m due to the standard war which reduces the total payoff. Here, each firm will 
receive $3m. These payoffs indicate that the firms are better off with one 
prevailing standard. 
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A Nash equilibrium occurs where neither firm has an incentive to change its 
strategy. In a one-shot version of this game, if Firm A leads, Firm B’s best 
response is to follow, where Firm A still prefers to lead. Thus, a Nash equilibrium 
is Firm A leads, Firm B follows, with payoffs (6 , 4). Another Nash equilibrium is 
Firm A follows, Firm B leads, with payoffs (4 , 6). Thus, both firms do better by 
agreeing on a single standard than fighting, but the firm that gets its commitment 
in first does better than the follower.  
 
An interesting case is when the market would benefit from having a single 
standard, i.e. one firm leads and the other follows, but the distortions in payoffs in 
favour of the firm that leads is so great that the follower will prefer to risk a 
standards war. This is a form of the “prisoners’ dilemma” game. Here, all players 
would do better off agreeing, i.e. one lead and the other follows, but when each 
firm tries to gain an advantage at the expense of the other, they end up disagreeing 
to their mutual loss. The payoffs in this game can be illustrated in the following 
figure: 
 
  
Firm B 
 
  
LEAD FOLLOW 
 
Firm A 
LEAD ( 3 , 3 ) ( 8 , 2 ) 
 FOLLOW ( 2 , 8 ) ( 0 , 0 ) 
  
Figure 9: Payoffs in “prisoners’ dilemma” game 
(Grindley 1995:34) 
 
Compared to “the battle of the sexes” game, the distribution of the payoffs is now 
more in favour of the leader. The firm that leads will receive $8m, while the 
follower only receives $2m. If the firms agree on one standard the total industry 
payoff will be $10m, as before. If both firms lead, this gives each firm a payoff of 
$3m, resulting in a total market payoff of $6. These payoffs indicate that the 
players jointly would do better by agreeing instead of fighting, but the follower’s 
payoff is too low for the firm to forego the chance of winning the standards 
contest. 
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If Firm B will choose to follow, Firm A will prefer to lead. However, if Firm A 
leads, then Firm B also will prefer to lead. This will result in the equilibrium 
outcome (3 , 3) and a standards war. Hence, total payoff in the market will only be 
$6m, compared to $10m if they would agree to one standard. The outcome will 
therefore not be socially optimal. 
 
A possible situation that would result in the “prisoners’ dilemma” game rather 
than the “battle of the sexes” game, might for example be in a network market 
where the market is “tippy”. In such a situation the outcome may be large gains 
for the winning standard. Thereby the firms may be willing to risk a standard 
battle which reduces their joint profits. The “tippyness” of network markets was 
illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
However, Firm A (or Firm B) could ensure an agreement by changing the game, 
through committing to make side payments of $2m to Firm B (or Firm A) if the 
firm instead follows. In this case, the modified payoffs would be $6m to Firm A 
that leads and $4m to Firm B that follows, with the outcome (6 , 4) as in “the 
battle of the sexes” game. Such side payments could for example take the form of 
reasonable licensing terms of the technology constituting the leader’s standard. In 
the case when payoff differences are low it is less important whose standard is 
adopted. With no strong gains to be made by leading, the industry may agree on 
one standard. In such cases de facto standards may be established through market 
forces (Grindley 1995:34).  
 
Open standards are also a way to alter the outcome of this game. An essential part 
of the logic behind open standards is that they may counteract the distortions in 
payoffs in favour of the firm that leads. By modifying the payoffs, the payoff of 
the leader and follower may be made more equal (Grindley 1995:35). 
  
GRA 19002 Master Thesis                                                                          01.09.09  
74 
 
5. The Case: Office Open XML 
 
This part will present the case of Office Open XML (OOXML). This specific 
standard will be analysed by applying the economic theory of compatibility 
standards and open standards presented earlier. First, the background of office 
document formats will introduce the specific type of software that OOXML 
concerns. Hereunder, the Extensible Markup Language (XML) standard will be 
presented since this concern the interoperability, i.e. compatibility, aspect of 
OOXML. Thereafter, the OOXML standard will be presented and analysed. The 
analysis will focus on the compatibility and the openness of the OOXML 
standard. Since the analysis concerns the economic impacts of OOXML, the 
presentation of the technological aspect of OOXML will be basic. Finally, on the 
basis of these analyses, conclusions about the economic impacts of OOXML 
based on economic theory will be presented. 
 
5.1. Background Office Document Formats 
 
Document formats are how a computer stores memos or spreadsheets (Shah and 
Kesan 2008:2). Word processing programs are used for the creation and formation 
of documents.  Word processing tools work on an abstract internal representation 
of the document, and a document format is used to save and exchange it with 
other tools. Further, the advance in document formats is strongly linked to the 
launch of new versions of the corresponding word processor (Valoris 2003:12). 
 
When a program saves a text document into a file, the complex internal 
representation of the document must be written down from the computer’s main 
memory to the hard drive. Then the document subsequently can be reconstructed 
from this file. When stored data only is specified to the program that wrote it, the 
result is a proprietary document format. Some proprietary document formats have 
implemented a minimum level of functionalities to ensure that the document can 
be opened on different computers. However, some may remain incompatible 
between versions, e.g. different Word versions, and platforms, e.g. Mac and PC 
(Valoris 2003:12). 
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Import and export filters are provided by word processors. Such filters allow the 
transference of documents to other formats, thereby solving the issue of 
compatibility. Newer versions of the software are often backward compatible. For 
example is Microsoft Office 2007 backward compatible with previous versions of 
MS Office. However, as technology progresses more functionalities are offered by 
word processors. A result may be formatting information loss, and consequently 
format degradation, when converting documents to an older format. An example 
is that MS Office 2007 converts formulas into pictures when converting the file to 
an older format. For end-users this may result in increased complexity, and it is 
not beneficial for the easy exchange of documents. As a result, it is seen as 
increasingly important that the document format is standardized by publishing and 
making its specifications available. With standardizing, saving a file will convert 
the internal representation of the text document to the standard format (Valoris 
2003:13). 
 
5.1.1. The XML standard 
Extensible Markup Language (XML) is a standard for describing content data. 
This content is possible to share across different systems and applications (Baker 
& McKenzie 2008:1). XML was developed by an XML Working Group, formed 
with the support of the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) in 1996. A 
document format based on XML is described by an XML markup language
2
 
(Valoris 2003:15). 
 
Firstly, one characteristic of XML is that it emphasises descriptive markup instead 
of procedural markup. The markup codes or tags that are used in a descriptive 
markup system only define what the element content is, instead of how it can be 
processed. In XML, there is a clear distinction between the instructions needed to 
process a document for a particular purpose, e.g. to format the document, and the 
descriptive markup occurring within the document. There are two key advantages 
from this separation of description from processing. First, the same document can 
be processed differently on multiple channels, and for multiple user profiles. 
                                                 
2
 Markup languages are designed for the processing, definition and presentation of text. This 
language specifies code for formatting, both the layout and style, within a text file. The code used 
to specify the formatting is called tags. An example of a widely known and used markup language 
is HTML (Webopedia 2009). 
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Secondly, the document can be archived without any hindrance of machine-
specific processing instructions. 
 
A second characteristic of XML is its document type concept. This makes it 
possible to process different documents of the same type in an identical manner. 
The third key characteristic of XML is that it is independent of hardware or 
software systems. XML is designed with the aim to ensure that documents can be 
moved from different hardware and software systems without losing information. 
Whatever language or writing system XML documents use, they all employ an 
identical underlying character encoding which is defined by an international 
standard (Valoris 2003:16). 
 
XML should theoretically be platform-neutral. However, in practice vendors who 
want to protect the market for their platforms may take extensive actions to 
encode components such that only their own application suites are capable of 
processing the elements. A counterbalance is to develop open standards that are 
cross-industrial and widely adopted so that the inclusion of application or 
platform specific encoding is blocked. Further, documents that act upon different 
XML based formats are not necessarily compatible, and to convert documents 
between the two formats could be difficult (Valoris 2003:17). 
 
5.2. The OOXML standard 
 
Office Open XML (OOXML) is “an open standard for word-processing 
documents, presentations, and spreadsheets. It can be implemented by multiple 
applications on multiple platforms” (Ngo 2009:1). The standard’s intention is to 
provide its users with the benefit of an XML standard for their documents. This 
includes stability, preservation, interoperability, i.e. compatibility, and ongoing 
development. 
 
There are four forces that contributed to the creation of the OOXML standard, 
namely; the broad adoption of binary formats, technological progress, demand in 
the market for several applications, and challenges related to long-term 
preservation of information. The standardization of the OOXML format and 
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maintenance of the specification over time may ensure a continuous stability and 
development of the specification for its users. This thesis will not go in depth of 
OOXML’s technical specifications, but rather focus on the economic implications 
related to its standardization. 
 
In the following sections, first, a timeline of the standardization process of 
OOXML will be presented. Secondly, the standard’s purpose will be explained. 
Thereafter, the interoperability, i.e. the compatibility of OOXML will be 
presented. Subsequently, a conclusion about the economic impacts of OOXML 
related to compatibility standards will be presented. Thereafter, the openness of 
the OOXML standard will be discussed. Finally, on the basis of these discussions, 
a conclusion about the economic impacts of OOXML related to open standards 
will be presented. 
 
5.2.1. Timeline for the standardization 
ISO/IEC DIS 29500 was originally developed as the Office Open XML 
(OOXML) specification by Microsoft Corporation. The standard received in April 
2008 the necessary number of votes for approval as an ISO/IEC International 
Standard (ISO 2008a). A summary over the important events of the OOXML 
development and standardization will now be given. 
 
During the period from 1998 until 2000 Microsoft used XML to represent some 
information in MS Office documents. In March 2001 MS Office XP was released 
with the ability to save spreadsheets in an XML-based format. With the release of 
MS Office 2003 in April 2003, this Office-version was able to save documents 
and spreadsheets in an XML-based format. In November 2005 OOXML was 
submitted by Microsoft to Ecma for standardization. Ecma International is an 
industry association which standardizes Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT) and Consumer Electronics (CE) (Ecma 2009). Since OOXML 
builds on previous XML-based formats used in MS Office, OOXML includes 
XML representation for presentation. In November 2006 OOXML was used as 
the primary storage format when MS Office 2007 was released, in addition to 
supporting previous proprietary formats. 
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In December 2006 OOXML was approved as the “Standard ECMA-376 Office 
Open XML File Formats”. Thereafter, OOXML was submitted by Ecma 
International to ISO/IEC JTC 1 for approval for standardization through a fast-
track process. In September 2007 the members of ISO voted against the approval 
of OOXML. Ecma, as the submitter of the standard, thereafter attempted to 
improve the identified issues in the ISO members’ technical comments. In April 
2008 the ISO national standard bodies adjusted their initial votes and approved 
OOXML as the ISO/IEC standard 29500 (Kosek 2008:57). 
 
The ISO/IEC standard of OOXML is assumed to be fully implemented in 
Microsoft’s next major revision of MS Office. This will be Microsoft Office 2010, 
which is planned to be released in the first half of 2010 (Microsoft 2009a). 
 
5.2.2. The standard’s purpose 
The aim of creating Office Open XML was to give a complete representation of 
the already existing written material of word-processing documents, presentations 
and spreadsheets that are encoded in binary formats defined by Microsoft 
Corporation. The standardization process linked the following; means of 
representing and extending existing materials, providing detailed documentation 
and enabling interoperability to the previously discussed XML format. 
 
An important feature of the OOXML standard is to enable long-term preservation 
of information. Information has previously been encoded using binary formats 
that are profoundly attached to the programs that created that same information. 
The problem that arises when using binary formats is that, after a longer period of 
time, the information becomes exceedingly difficult to read without significant 
loss of content. Therefore a main concern for OOXML is to preserve the financial 
and intellectual investment made in such documents.  
 
5.3. Compatibility of OOXML 
 
Perfect interoperability across different systems implies that a format can be fully 
implemented in any application, regardless of the platform or system that this 
application operates on. However, since it is difficult to offer perfect 
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interoperability, OOXML’s approximate interoperability, as well as its potential 
for complete interoperability will be considered (Hiser 2007:10). In part 3 of this 
thesis, the economic effects of compatibility standards were analysed. In this 
section the interoperability, i.e. the economic term compatibility, of OOXML will 
be studied. Additionally, since the Open Interface requirement of open standards 
is connected to interoperability, the way that OOXML meets this requirement will 
also be analysed in this section. 
 
5.3.1. Is it possible to achieve compatibility with OOXML? 
According to Ecma (Ngo 2009), one of the Office Open XML standard’s 
properties are amongst others interoperability. It can be argued that 
interoperability is achieved since OOXML is independent of proprietary formats 
and features. This gives developers the possibility to write applications that use 
OOXML on multiple platforms. There are specific features in OOXML which 
seek to make the standard interoperable and hence distinct from binary formats. 
First is OOXML’s independence from some type of source content. Further, is its 
independence on the run-time environment
3
 of the application that produces a 
document. Furthermore, is the fact that OOXML match some open World Wide 
Web Consortium (W3C) standards like XML (Ngo 2009:4). 
 
Further, an advantage of OOXML is its backward compatibility with existing 
Microsoft Office documents. Achieving compatibility with existing documents 
stored in Microsoft proprietary binary format was a major design goal of OOXML 
(Ditch 2007:21). 
 
The degree of openness of the standardization setting process of OOXML, with 
contributions, modifications and review by committee members, contributed to its 
interoperability. The representation in the Ecma TC45 committee consisted of 
vendors, such as Microsoft, Apple, Intel and Toshiba, using different operating 
systems, like Windows, Linux and MacOS. In addition, corporations with 
financial interests and agents concerned with preservation were also represented 
(Ngo 2009). 
                                                 
3
 “A runtime environment provides software services for processes or programs while a computer 
is running” (Wikipedia 2009) 
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Conversely, supporters for the ODF document standard, i.e. the other ISO XML 
standard, claim that there are problems for document interoperability across 
multiple platforms with OOXML. The first claimed shortcoming is the platform 
dependencies of OOXML. It is claimed that certain platform dependencies of 
OOXML are features that can only be implemented or optimized for Microsoft’s 
operating system, Windows. Another claimed shortcoming is the possible 
application dependencies of OOXML. Examples are that OOXML documents’ 
collaborative functionality and integration with e-mail and other applications may 
depend upon purchase of additional software from Microsoft. Lastly, the ODF 
alliance claims that there are some elements of inadequate specification in 
OOXML. If a format feature is incompletely specified, other vendors’ products 
will not be interoperable with it. The ODF alliance concludes that OOXML is 
dependent or optimized for Microsoft software applications and platforms. 
Therefore, they claim that it will not function fully for non-Microsoft software 
(Hiser 2007:14). 
 
5.3.2. Test of compatibility 
Following, results from testing the interoperability among different current 
software implementations of the OOXML document format by Shah and Kesan 
(2008) will be presented. Shah and Kesan examine whether an implementation 
faithfully meet the requirement of the standard. Without multiple interoperable 
implementations, users may be locked-in to the dominant implementation of the 
standard. Thereby the users may lose some of the benefits resulting from adopting 
an open standard (Shah and Kesan 2008:2). 
 
A reference implementation is a fully functional implementation of a standard that 
you can compare and evaluate other implementations against. The test documents 
used by Shah and Kesan (2008) were developed in “Microsoft Office 2007 for 
Windows”. However, the implementation “Microsoft Office 2007 for Windows” 
does not perfectly implement the standard, but is the dominant implementation 
other developers seek compatibility with. Therefore, it currently acts as a de facto 
reference implementation. As mentioned, Microsoft will not support the ISO/IEC 
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standard of OOXML until their next major revision of Microsoft Office, which is 
Microsoft Office 2010 (Microsoft 2009a). 
 
The results for OOXML showed that there were no implementations that offered 
100% compatibility, other than Microsoft Office for Windows (2003 or 2007). 
Microsoft Office 2008 for Mac offered 99% compatibility. Further, the 
implementations “OpenOffice.org” from Novell with a plug-in translator for 
OOXML and Apple’s word processor “Pages” provided good compatibility with 
95-96%. However, “Pages” can only read, not write, OOXML documents. The 
implementations “Wordperfect” and “ThinkFree Office” offered fair compatibility 
with several problems. “TextEdit” offered low compatibility with 43% (Shah and 
Kesan 2008:14). 
 
The results show the difficulty in obtaining 100% interoperability for document 
formats. The only way to avoid interoperability issues may be to only use the 
leading implementation of the standard. However, there were good results for 
OOXML implementations. Criticism of OOXML has been that the standard is too 
complex and difficult to implement, however the results shows that it offers good 
compatibility.  
 
5.3.3. Economics of OOXML related to compatibility standards  
 
This section aims to link the economic models presented in part three to the 
OOXML standard, for thereby providing insight to the economic impacts of the 
OOXML standard. Therefore, some of the points presented in chapter three will 
be discussed in light of the OOXML case. First, some of the characteristics of the 
software market will be presented, and thereafter relevant points from part three 
will be drawn. 
 
Since the software market is characterised by network externalities, the economic 
models based on network externalities can be considered as relevant. Figure 1 
illustrates how a network market is “tippy” as a direct consequence of the 
positive-feedback effect. Given the network externalities in the document 
software market, this may be an explanation for why the Microsoft’s Office is a 
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dominant program/network in the market. In the presence of network externalities 
it is important to obtain a large network size for the network to be sustainable. 
Likewise, when the OOXML standard will be fully implemented, it might be 
possible to assume that the same effect will occur for this standard. It can 
therefore be argued that the market might tip towards the OOXML standard 
because of the network effect. 
 
Another characteristic of the software market is the usually high fixed sunk cost 
combined with more or less insignificant marginal costs. This implies that the 
average cost function declines sharply with the number of products sold to 
consumers. Being so, such markets will normally be characterised by dominant 
leader(s) that serve the majority of the market (Shy 2001). In the compatibility 
model by Katz and Shapiro (1985) in section 3.3, it was shown that given zero 
marginal costs, achieving compatibility would increase the total output in the 
market. The level of total output was found to be greater under industry-wide 
compatibility than in any equilibrium with less than complete compatibility, 
according to Figure 4. Hence, consumer surplus will increase with the move to 
complete compatibility. Then, if the sum of the change in industry-wide profits is 
positive, the change in social welfare is positive. Achieving compatibility was 
hence found to be socially beneficial. 
 
From the analysis of the compatibility of OOXML, the results indicate good 
compatibility. However, these results may be somewhat uncertain since the 
OOXML standard is not yet fully implemented. Given compatibility of OOXML 
when it is fully implemented, the economic effects from achieving compatibility 
in the models presented in section 3.2 and 3.3 will be relevant. If the results from 
Shah and Kesan (2008) remain valid given full implementation, i.e. OOXML 
achieves compatibility; the economic models might imply that the price of the 
products/network that implement the OOXML standard will be higher compared 
to the situation with incompatibility, i.e. no implementation of the standard. It is 
not the price of the standard itself that might increase through achieving 
compatibility, rather the products/network that becomes compatible because of the 
implementation of the standard. 
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The network model related to compatibility developed by the authors of this thesis 
and the compatibility model by Katz and Shapiro (1985) show diverging result for 
compatibility with respect to the effect on consumer surplus. In the network 
model related to compatibility in section 3.2, it was shown that consumer surplus 
decreased with compatibility. Here, the result was that the negative effects of 
increased price dominate. A limitation of this model is that is does not compare 
output, both under compatibility or incompatibility, as is done in the Katz and 
Shapiro (1985) model. In the Katz and Shapiro (1985) model in section 3.3 it was 
shown that consumer surplus would increase with compatibility, as the total 
output was larger under complete compatibility than under less than complete 
compatibility, refer Figure 4. The model concluded that the positive effects from 
the increased network benefits dominated the negative effects of increased price, 
thus compatibility will increase consumer surplus. 
 
5.3.4. Conclusion 
The above sections discussed the compatibility of OOXML and analysed the 
economic impacts of OOXML related to compatibility standards. The results from 
the discussion of the compatibility of OOXML can be related to the model of 
compatibility standards of Katz and Shapiro (1985). The model confirmed that the 
consumers benefit from achieving compatibility which was illustrated in Figure 4. 
Findings support the claim that implementations OOXML offers compatibility. 
Given this is so; it may be possible to conclude that the OOXML standard may 
lead to increased welfare for consumers in a network market through achieving 
compatibility. In the model of network externality related to compatibility the 
prices were increased, even though the market is characterised by network 
externalities. Here it was illustrated that having compatible programmes would 
“cancel out” the network externalities, as a firm have no need to reduce its prices 
to attract consumers to his network. This was in line with the model by Katz and 
Shapiro. This might imply that the price of the products that implement the 
OOXML standard will be higher compared to the situation with incompatibility. 
However, the two models gave somewhat diverging results when it came to 
consumer surplus. However, due to the fact that OOXML is not yet fully 
implemented, it is difficult for certain to conclude on the economic effects of 
OOXML. The conclusions therefore build on assumptions. 
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5.4. Openness of OOXML 
 
The degree of openness in document formats will influence the possibility for free 
flow of information across computer systems. Previously, several criteria for 
openness of standards related to different stakeholders have been presented, and 
these will now be used to examine the degree of openness of Office Open XML. 
 
5.4.1. Openness of OOXML related to stakeholders’ perspectives 
In order to answer the first three requirements, Open Meeting, Consensus and Due 
Process, the standardization procedures in Ecma and ISO need to be examined.  
 
According to the ODF alliance, the standardization process in Ecma International 
was not so transparent since the voting, balloting and appeals policies are not 
published. The ODF group also claims that Microsoft’s Office software 
development group pre-developed the formats and had veto power over changes 
proposed in the technical committee. Further, it is claimed that there were high 
barriers to participation in the development of OOXML. The Ecma membership 
requirements are restrictive in that individuals are not allowed to participate 
except by invitation or through corporate membership. The ODF group concludes 
that OOXML is a single-vendor specification that was not developed in a manner 
that was open to public participation. In addition they claim that Microsoft is the 
single vendor that has control over the development of OOXML (Hiser 2007:4).  
 
ISO standards are developed by national delegations of experts in a committee, 
who meet to discuss and debate until a consensus is reached on a draft agreement. 
Since substantial technical development and debate had already occurred in Ecma, 
resulting in some international recognition, OOXML was submitted for the fast-
track processing. The resulting draft agreement was then circulated as a Draft 
International Standard (DIS) to all ISO’s member bodies for voting and comment. 
The national member bodies should take into account the opinions of all parties 
that are interested in the standard under its development. Being voluntary 
agreements, ISO standards need to be based on consensus of international expert 
opinion, implying that substantial objections are resolved. However, consensus 
need not imply unanimity. The voting needs approval of minimum two-thirds of 
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the ISO national members that participate in the standardization, and not be 
rejected by more than a quarter of all ISO members who vote on the standard. 
Appeals related to procedural, technical or administrative issues may be put 
forward (ISO 2008c). 
 
The Open World requirement for open standards is supported by ISO. ISO 
standards are technical agreements which support the realization of worldwide 
compatible technology. The OOXML standard is therefore designed with the 
purpose of being globally relevant (ISO 2008 d). 
 
Further, the requirement Open IPR for open standards relates to how the 
intellectual property rights (IPR) enclosed in standards is made available. 
According to the ISO/IEC patent policy, licenses are required to be made 
available on reasonable and non-discriminatory (RAND) terms and conditions. 
This holds for all patents that are needed in the implementation of an ISO/IEC 
international standard. Therefore, Microsoft, as the holder of the patents related to 
the implementation of ISO/IEC 29500, has made such a declaration to ISO and 
IEC (ISO 2008 e). However, only what is explicitly specified in the standard is 
protected by the patent-protection pledge in “Microsoft Open Specification 
Promise”. Therefore implicit, referenced and undocumented features and 
behaviours of the OOXML format may risk violating Microsoft’s software 
intellectual property rights (Hiser 2007:9). Microsoft contradicts this, and claim 
that their commitment go beyond what ISO/IEC requires (Microsoft 2009b). An 
extreme option is that, after the publication of the standard, ISO has the possibility 
to withdraw the International Standard if it is determined that licenses to all 
required patents are not so available (ISO 2008e).  
 
The openness criteria Open Change is ensured since ISO reviews all international 
standards at least three years after the initial publication, and every five years after 
the first review by all the ISO member bodies. It is the majority of participating 
members who decide whether an international standard should be confirmed, 
revised or withdrawn (ISO 2008c). 
 
Moreover, the requirement Open Documents for open standards might be said to 
be met since the OOXML specification is free to download from the Ecma 
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International website. Additionally, many ISO members have public review 
procedures for making proposed work-in-progress documents and drafts available 
for those that are interested. The ISO international standards are also available for 
purchase through the ISO web store or through ISO’s national members (ISO 
2008c). However, the OOXML standard may be difficult to access on a practical 
level since it is very long and complex with its approximately 6000 pages. 
Another critique from the ODF alliance is claims that it is inconsistent in its 
terminology and contains deliberate omissions. There may be areas where 
OOXML have significant challenges related to its full, open availability. For 
example, OOXML contain undocumented elements which makes it difficult for 
other implementers than Microsoft to create effective alternative implementations 
of the standard. Other elements that are designed into, but undefined by the 
OOXML specification, may possibly make OOXML single-vendor dependent. 
This might hinder a full implementation by other applications than Microsoft 
Office (Hiser 2007:7). 
 
Since the Open Interface requirement is connected to the compatibility of 
OOXML, as analysed in a previous section, this requirement will not be further 
analysed here, and section 5.3 is referred to. 
 
ISO meet the requirement Open Use for consumers since its international 
standards provide assurance about products’ quality, safety and reliability. Open 
Use may also be said to be related to the format’s availability for implementation, 
since a standard needs to be implemented in software before consumers may use 
it. With this in regard, the critique put forward related to the implementation of 
Open Documents may be repeated. Additionally, Open Use may require the 
possibility for multiple implementations. It is possible to say that an open format 
encompasses characteristics that may attract multiple implementations. However, 
MS Office 2007 is currently the only application that has partially implemented 
OOXML, and there exists currently no application which is a complete reference 
implementation for ISO/IEC 29500 (Hiser 2007:9). Microsoft on the other hand 
states that the global adoption, support and momentum for OOXML file formats 
are growing exponentially (Microsoft 2008).  
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Lastly, Ongoing Support will be ensured through the continuous development of 
OOXML by ISO. 
 
Based on this analysis of how the openness requirements are met by OOXML, it 
is possible to see that the openness of OOXML is somewhat controversial, 
although there are several arguments in favour of OOXML as an open standard. 
This international standard’s supporters claim that OOXML is an open standard, 
whereas its opponents or sceptics are concerned with the standard’s actual 
openness. Microsoft claims that OOXML is an open standard and that it promotes 
choice in document formats. Further, Microsoft states that they endorse choice 
and technological neutrality, and that users should consider both OOXML and 
ODF (Microsoft 2008). 
 
5.4.2. Economics of OOXML related to open standards 
When analysing Microsoft’s decision to have OOXML standardized by Ecma 
International and ISO/IEC, it can be argued that Microsoft has moved away from 
their previously proprietary formats, towards open formats. Therefore, in the 
terminology from the economics of open standards, they have moved from taking 
a leading and proprietary position in the market, i.e. “Sponsor/Defend”, towards 
taking a leading and open access position in the market, i.e. “Give Away”, refer 
Figure 7. The presented advantages for a proprietary standard were that the firm 
may obtain monopoly control of its market, and therefore can keep its market 
share and margins high. A large market share is the case for Microsoft Office, 
with a market share of approximately 95%. 
 
Potential positive benefits for a leader of open standards were greater likelihood 
of acceptance and larger total market. An open standard is usually easier to 
establish because of wider support from other manufacturers and users. With open 
standards, firms may create compatible products, and hence increase the total 
output in the market. It has in fact been claimed that Microsoft submitted 
OOXML for open standardization in order to expand market opportunities for 
Microsoft Office (Creese and O’Kelly 2008:22). Hence, the incentive for 
Microsoft may have been the increasing pressure for open standardization, 
together with high chance of winning the XML document format standards “war”, 
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the possibility for a expanding the market, as well as broad external support. 
Negative consideration may have been low license earnings as Microsoft had to 
make the “Microsoft Open Specification Promise”. 
 
The Katz and Shapiro (1985) model considered the possibility for firms to make 
side payments to one another, combined with having a product standard as the 
method for achieving compatibility. Then it was argued that the products of a 
given set of firms will only be made compatible if all of these firms would earn 
greater profits as a result. Hence, when the compatibility mechanism is a standard, 
allowing for cost sharing through side payments will increase the possibility for 
the firms to choose compatibility. The set of cases in which the firms fail to adopt 
a standard that is socially beneficial is therefore larger when it is not possible to 
make side payments. If it is not possible to make side payments it is the change in 
firms’ individual level of profit that will motivate the decision to achieve 
compatibility. This effect may be related to the RAND terms of OOXML, which 
might allow Microsoft, as a patent holder, to charge reasonable and non-
discriminatory licenses fees. If RAND may be seen as cost sharing this will hence 
be positive for achieving compatibility. 
 
The benefit of cost sharing was also discussed in the in the “prisoners’ dilemma” 
game in section 4.5.3. In the “prisoners’ dilemma” game, an outcome of one 
standard would yield large payoffs for the leader firm and low payoffs for the 
follower firm. Here, the players would jointly do better by agreeing instead of 
fighting. Since the follower’s payoff was too low for it to forego the chance of 
winning the standards contest, the firms would be willing to risk a standard battle 
which would reduce their joint profits. However, one of the firms could ensure an 
agreement by changing the game, through committing to make side payments to 
the firm that follows. This would result in modified and a smaller difference in 
payoffs. Such side payments could for example take the form of reasonable 
licensing terms of the technology constituting the leader’s standard. 
 
Hereunder, it was also proclaimed that the introduction of open standards is a way 
to alter the outcome of this game. An essential part of the logic behind open 
standards is that they may counteract the distortions in payoffs in favour of the 
firm that leads. By modifying the payoffs, the payoff of the leader and follower 
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may be made more equal. If it can be argued that OOXML is an open standard, 
this model can illustrate the economic effect on the document format market. The 
openness of OOXML might hence modify the payoffs of the firms in the 
document format market, and might result in more equal payoffs. 
 
Comparing the results from the compatibility analysis of OOXML and the 
openness analysis of OOXML there might be two opposing forces; compatibility 
might increase the prices in the network that implements OOXML and openness 
of the OOXML standard might reduce payoffs, i.e. prices. It is difficult to say 
which force will dominate. However, Microsoft has announced that with the 
global release of MS Office 2010, a reduced version of MS Office 2010, “Office 
Web”, will be made available on internet for free. It will be possible to use the 
“Office Web” applications on several platforms (Rossen 2009). 
 
5.4.3. Conclusion 
The above sections presented the openness of OOXML related to stakeholders 
perspectives and discussed the economic impacts of OOXML related to openness 
of standards. As was observed from the static game models, open standard can 
help resolve the outcome in the case when the industry would do better off with a 
single standard. This might be the situation in the document format market, since 
software markets are characterised by network externalities which might result in 
the market tipping to one network. In the “prisoners’ dilemma” game the players 
will be better off agreeing, but since each firm tries to gain an advantage at the 
expense of the other, they end up disagreeing to their mutual loss. Open standards 
might modify the payoffs, and hence change the combined leadership and access 
decisions. It is difficult to conclude on whether this simple game model is 
transferable to the complexity of the real life case of OOXML. If the conclusion is 
that the international standard OOXML is a relatively open standard, the 
economic consequences will be positive since an agreement in the game model 
will yield a higher total payoff in equilibrium. Whether the openness of OOXML 
will yield lower prices of the software/network that implements the standard and 
dominate the opposing force of increased prices through compatibility is difficult 
to conclude on before the standards full implementation. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
The main research question of this thesis was “What are the economic impacts of 
compatibility standards?”, with the sub-research question “What are the economic 
impacts of “ISO/IEC 29500:2008 Information technology – Document description 
and processing languages - Office Open XML file formats?”. Because of these 
two research questions, the focus of this thesis has been twofold; first the focus 
was on general standardization theory, and thereafter the theory was applied to the 
OOXML case. 
 
In order to answer the main research question, the thesis discussed theory related 
to compatibility standards, and showed the economic impacts of achieving 
compatibility through the derivation of several models. The markets analysed in 
the models were characterised by network externalities. A focus has also been on 
comparing the social and private incentives for achieving compatibility, in order 
to analyse whether private incentives for achieving compatibility are sufficient. 
 
From the network model related to compatibility, derived by the authors of this 
thesis, the equilibrium result with incompatibility was that the equilibrium prices 
would decline. The reason was that consumer demand became more price 
sensitive. When introducing compatibility, the authors of this thesis showed that 
the consumers’ buying decision was not affected by the network externalities. 
Therefore, the price competition became more relaxed under complete 
compatibility. The decrease in consumer surplus indicated that the consumers 
were worse off under complete compatibility. These results for the network model 
related to compatibility are new and interesting economic implications to the 
model by Moen (2008) and the Hotelling model, which were proven by the 
authors of this thesis. 
 
The same result was found in the compatibility model by Katz and Shapiro 
(1985); achieving complete compatibility would increase the equilibrium prices. 
However, when calculating the consumer surplus it was found that the negative 
effects of increased prices were dominated by the positive effects from network 
benefits. This was illustrated in Figure 4, which showed that total output was 
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larger under complete compatibility compared to incomplete compatibility. The 
thesis concluded that compatibility will lead to higher welfare, and if marginal 
cost remained unchanged, it would also increase firm’s total profits due to the 
expectations formations. The model illustrated the importance of fulfilled 
consumer expectations in a market characterised with network externalities.  
 
Further, the compatibility model by Katz and Shapiro (1985) showed that the 
social and private incentives for achieving compatibility may diverge. The 
oligopoly quality model, derived by the authors of this thesis, drew a parallel from 
compatibility to quality. When compatibility was interpreted as a quality 
improvement for the consumers, the model showed that firms have too low 
incentives for providing compatibility. In equilibrium, the oligopoly firms 
provided lower quality than the socially optimal level of quality, given the 
Cournot level of quantity. This was because the firms were not able to extract the 
full social benefit of the increased quality. The equilibrium result of the 
oligopolies’ choice of quantity and quality, and the results from the welfare 
analysis of the oligopoly quality model, are new economical findings derived by 
the authors of this thesis. 
 
Regarding the sub-research question, the thesis discussed the compatibility and 
openness of the international standard OOXML, and related this discussion to it’s 
the economic implications. The findings in the thesis suggested that OOXML 
offers compatibility. Given this is so for the future full implementation of 
OOXML; it may be possible to conclude that the OOXML standard may lead to 
increased total output in the market, and hence increased welfare for consumers 
through achieving compatibility. The economic models of compatibility standards 
might imply that the prices of the software/network that implement the OOXML 
standard will increase compared to the situation with incompatibility. Based on 
the analysis of how the openness requirements are met by OOXML, it was 
possible to see that the openness of OOXML is somewhat controversial. This 
international standard’s supporters claim that OOXML is an open standard, 
whereas its sceptics are concerned with the standard’s actual openness. If the 
conclusion is that the international standard OOXML is a relatively open standard, 
the economic consequences will be positive. Whether such positive consequences 
of openness will yield lower prices of the software/network that implements the 
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standard, strong enough to dominate the opposing force of increased prices 
through compatibility, is difficult to conclude on before the standards full 
implementation. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Brief description of the issues and motivation  
 
This thesis will analyse the social impact of ISO/IEC 29500:2008, Information 
technology – Document description and processing languages - Office Open XML 
file formats (OOXML). “ISO/IEC 29500 is a standard for word-processing 
documents, presentations and spreadsheets that is intended to be implemented by 
multiple applications on multiple platforms.” (ISO 2008). The aim of ISO/IEC 
29500 is to ensure long-term preservation of documents using programmes that 
are becoming non-compatible with new improvements in the domain of 
information technology. ISO/IEC DIS 29500 was originally developed as the 
Office Open XML specification (OOXML) by Microsoft Corporation, and 
received in April 2008 the necessary number of votes for approval as an ISO/IEC 
International Standard (ISO 2008a). The International Organisation for 
Standardisation, ISO, is the leading organisation of the formal standards bodies. It 
is a network of national standards institutes of 157 countries with one member per 
country (ISO 2008b). Membership is a mixture of national partnerships of 
industry associations and institutions which are a part of the governmental 
structure or mandated by the governments of their home countries (Ditch 
2007:10-11). 
 
Computer software for reading, creating and editing content can be grouped into 
two categories; software which enables creation and editing of content and 
software which display or print content. These two software categories manipulate 
content which is stored as a file and it is the format of this file which is the centre 
of our analysis. In the beginning of personal computers there was a great amount 
of different software packages unable to read formats from other vendors. This 
made it very difficult for users to exchange documents with each others. When the 
software market matured in the 1980s interoperability was achieved through 
market consolidation. A few proprietary file formats came to dominate, amongst 
them WordPerfect, Lotus 1-2-3 and Microsoft’s .doc, .xls and .ppt file types. 
These are examples of de facto standardisation motivated by a network effect 
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(Ditch 2007:4). The definition of network effects and standards will be further 
explained and discussed in the literature review. 
 
An ongoing progress of developing a common document format resulted in the 
new mark-up language XML which is a standard format that enables the storage 
and organisation of information. Documents stored in this format and plain text 
files, rather than binary files, will be readable and processable for a long time. 
This ensures flexibility and potentially interoperability. There is diminishing 
acceptance for the use of binary file formats, especially those that require the use 
of proprietary software. Proprietary, de facto standards is increasingly viewed as a 
type of vendor lock-in, which reduces consumer choice and increases cost (Ditch 
2007:5). 
 
Due to the move from binary towards XML-based formats, there has been 
increased pressure to consider formats through a standardisation process involving 
formal standards organisations. This encourages software producers, such as 
Microsoft, to “open” previously closed file formats (Ditch 2007:10-11). In 
addition to the standard OOXML there is another internationally recognised 
editing office document file formats, namely ISO/IEC 26300:2006 Open 
Document Format for Office Applications which was approved in May 2006. Sun 
Microsystems released the Open Document Format standard to the public as a 
response to Microsoft’s proprietary formats. Its standardisation was voted 
unanimous by participating members of the ISO (Mathew 2008:6). For non-
revisable office documents, Adobe’s Portable Document Format (PDF) has 
become a de facto standard for display and distribution of such documents. 
ISO/IEC 29500:2008 Office Open XML file formats has caused substantial 
controversies concerning both the need for two co-existing ISO standards for open 
XML document formats and the OOXML format’s supposed lack of openness.  
 
A press release from The Ministry of Government Administration and Reform in 
Norway published the 21
st
 of December 2007 stated that The Norwegian 
Government has decided that all information on state-operated web sites should 
be accessible in the open document formats HTML, PDF or ODF. This mean that 
public documents no longer only will be published in closed formats. The 
information and communication technology (ICT) development in the public 
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sector will hereafter be based on open standards. For the future, it will not be 
accepted that government bodies are locking users of public information to closed 
formats. From the 1
st
 of January 2009 when these new demands will take effect, 
Norwegian citizens can choose themselves which software to use in order to get 
access to information from public offices. Another effect the Government intends 
to achieve with this decision is increased competition between suppliers of office 
programs (Ministry of Government Administration and Reform 2007). 
 
Another motivation for this thesis, besides the controversies of the OOXML 
standard and how it will affect the market, is our personal experience with the 
problem of incompatibility between different software program versions. The 
inability of Microsoft’s Word 2003 to open and edit files created in Word 2007 is 
a source of inspiration for further analyses of these issues. 
 
1.2 The research question 
 
The thesis will aim to analyse the social impact of “ISO/IEC 29500:2008 
Information technology – Document description and processing languages - 
Office Open XML file formats”. The primary focus will be on Norway, where we 
will attempt to describe the effects on the market, in addition to its associated 
benefits and costs. We anticipate concluding whether it is sensible for Norway to 
choose this standard by applying economic reasoning. The choice of other 
countries may in this respect be relevant for Norway’s choices.  
 
1.3 Addressing the research question 
 
The research question stated above will be addressed by using applied 
microeconomics, where the aim is to utilize relevant economic theories to 
describe and analyse the case. We will assemble further literature in order to 
perform in-depth study of acknowledged economic theory and material relevant 
for the case. In addition, we will examine the research question by using 
analytical models, market analysis, as well as to execute interviews with key 
agents involved in the standardisation process in Norway. How we will address 
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the research question will be further described in the methodological approach 
section presented later in this paper. We emphasise that this thesis will look upon 
several sides of the OOXML standard in order to make a more comprehensive 
analysis that highlight the opposing arguments.  
2. Literature review 
 
This master thesis will apply theories of network externalities and compatibility 
standards, and therefore important aspects of these theories will now be presented 
as an overview. 
 
2.1 Network externalities 
 
2.1.1 Motivation and definition  
Network externalities are interesting phenomenon as it will change both 
characteristics of the market and the nature of the industry competition. A 
network will exist when the consumer value of a product enhances as the number 
of users increases. Each additional consumer will obtain private benefits by 
joining the network, but also provide external benefits on existing consumers.  A 
definition of a network externality can therefore be “a benefit conferred on users 
of such a product by another’s purchase of the product” (Page and Lopatka 1999: 
953) which is not taken into consideration. Since the consumers do not take into 
consideration the network externalities, a network may never reach an optimal 
size. Another interesting side of this phenomenon is when incompatible standards 
compete. This may result in “tipping” of the market often towards the standard 
that obtains an early advantage, even if the standard is inferior (Page and Lopatka 
1999). The above will be further discussed in the following part. 
 
Pepall, Richards and Norman (2005) describe network externalities by using a 
simplified example of Rohlfs analysis (1974) of the telecommunication service, 
and thereby show how the value of a product to any one consumer will increase 
due to the additional consumers that buy the product. Through this example one 
will observe how there exists interdependence between the portion of the market 
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being served and consumers’ willingness to pay that will lead to network 
externalities. What is also exemplified is how an individual consumer only will 
take into account one owns value of joining the network. They will, in other 
words, not take into consideration the external advantages they create when 
becoming a member of the network nor the impact when leaving it. Becoming a 
member will improve the value of the network as it will be enlarged, and in 
contrast, the value will decrease when one leaves the network (Pepall et al. 2005: 
616-617). Due to the fact that a network must be large to become feasible, an 
observed tendency is the outcome of either one (monopoly) or two suppliers 
(duopoly). A supplier will therefore have strong incentives of reaching the so-
called “critical mass” (Rohlfs 1974), which is the lower fraction that must be 
obtained in order for the network to become sustainable. If the network has not 
breached this point, customers will then have an interest to wait to join until 
others do so.  
 
2.1.2 Distinction between direct and indirect network externalities 
Economides (1998) explain how network externalities are more distinct in the 
telecommunication and the computer service industries, and, as many economists 
before him, describes how one can distinguish between direct and indirect 
network externalities. Direct network externalities, often found in a physical two-
way communications network (Rohlfs 1974) can be exemplified from the 
telecommunication industry as a positive relationship between the value of the 
network for a consumer and the number of subscribers of it. In other words, a 
positive-feedback effect (Katz and Shapiro 1994).  Indirect network externalities 
can be explained from the computer industry, as the value of a product or a system 
that depend on the complementarity between the different components. The 
combination of these goods or services will complete some desired task (Page and 
Lopatka 1999), and this means that the complementarity leads to consumers 
shopping for systems rather than individual products (Shy 2001).  
 
2.1.3 Relation between network externalities and compatibility 
Oz Shy explains how goods and services that ought to be regarded as 
complements, must be consumed together with other compatible products in order 
to gain value.  It is important to mention that the benefits of complementarity 
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must be obtained through standardization and interoperability between the 
components (Economides 1998: 2). This will be addressed in further detail in the 
standards section of this preliminary thesis, where it amongst other things states 
that a standard can be regarded as information good. Being so, complementarity 
will then play a crucial role in the markets for information goods (Shy 2001). 
Another central aspect of indirect network externalities is the fact that one user’s 
adoption of a certain system will not have a direct impact on the utility of other 
users. Instead there will be an indirect, lagged effect through for instance the 
provision of software programming (Katz and Shapiro 1994).   
 
One can study services being shaped in a network through the mixture of different 
complementary components composing a chain. Economides provides an 
argument saying that the value a firm may extract will not only depend on the 
competition in the particular component market the firm operates in, but also 
depend on the competition in each of the other markets of complementary 
components in that chain (Economides 1998). Take for instance the classical 
example of the software/hardware paradigm. One can then observe (being that the 
components are bought at different periods of time) that the prices and 
expectations of use of for instance the software, will affect the choice of buying 
the hardware (Katz and Shapiro 1994). The consumer must therefore anticipate 
for the second period both its use of the hardware bought in the first period and 
the future availability of compatible software, as such a choice may lead to the 
consumer being “locked-in” to the specific hardware/software system. The 
switching cost to another system can be substantial and therefore not desirable.  
 
2.1.4 Market implications  
It should be noted that the type of switching cost will affect the degree of lock-in, 
and it will also affect the price competition (Shy 2001). As a consequence of the 
possibility of being locked-in, demand in the first period will depend on the 
expectations that are formed about the second period (Katz and Shapiro 1994: 98). 
Being so, consumers’ expectations about the network will influence the 
competitive equilibrium. Due to the presence of expectations, producers will have 
an incentive to convince their consumers that their network will attract many 
users. They will strive to shape consumers’ expectations to their benefit and 
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minimizing any uncertainty.  Uncertainty may increase the possibility that the 
market will not develop at all (Lopatka and Page 1999).  
As discussed above, due to the lack of consideration of the social benefits a 
purchaser pose on others, the network may never reach an optimal size. The 
existence of network externalities may in fact cause a market to fail as there may 
not be equilibrium, or that multiple equilibria exist. There is also a possibility that 
the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics may not be valid (Katz and 
Shapiro 1994: 94). Oz Shy has explained how these networks never will reach a 
competitive equilibrium. This is due to the high fixed sunk cost combined with 
more or less insignificant marginal costs, which in turn imply that the average cost 
function declines at high speed with the number of products sold to consumers. 
Being so, such markets will normally be characterized by dominant leader(s) that 
serve the majority of the market (Shy 2001).   
 
Katz and Shapiro have described how for instance adoption externalities can make 
the equilibrium network size smaller than the socially optimal network size; hence 
the perfectly competitive equilibrium will not be efficient. This will also be the 
case even when the adoption externalities at the individual level are small which 
may lead to sufficient social welfare losses. This is due to the positive-feedback 
character of networks (Katz and Shapiro 1994: 96). Another significant challenge 
is the coordination problem among both firms and consumers. Even though such 
problems occur in most markets, the coordination requirements by the 
competition of systems is often more pervasive and open, using devices such as 
long-term contracts, industry-wide standard setting bodies and common 
ownership of diverse components suppliers (Katz and Shapiro 1994).  
 
2.1.5 Network effects vs. network externalities  
Studying the literature of markets of system, a discussion on whether network 
effects are in fact network externalities should be in place. It seems that the 
distinction has been taken more into consideration by some authors than others, 
who might encompass all network effects in the term network externalities. For 
instance, Liebowitz and Margolis (1994:135) would only use the term network 
externality to those specific network effects in which “the equilibrium exhibits 
gains from trade regarding the network participation”. By this definition, network 
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externalities do cause market failure, however it is less frequent than network 
effects in general (Page and Lopatka 1999). There are scholars who will disagree 
with Liebowitz and Margolis’ suggestions about the amount of network 
externalities compared to network effects. Katz and Shapiro have approved and 
used the distinction between network externalities and network effects, but differ 
on how common these externalities are. Taking the hardware/software paradigm, 
one must question whether any deviation between the social optimum and market 
equilibrium stems from externalities or a consumer coordination failure, or if it is 
in fact due to monopoly power (Katz and Shapiro 1994). As stated earlier, one 
will often find monopoly or duopoly in network economies due to the requirement 
of substantial size, or economies of scale, in order to be feasible.   
 
2.2 Compatibility standards 
 
2.2.1 Motivation 
Carl Shapiro (2008) presents the motivation behind standards in the article Setting 
Compatibility Standards: Cooperation or Collusion?. Product standards are a key 
fundament in the world and they drive an extensive part of the information 
economy. They are a result of systems where complementary products work 
together to meet the needs of consumers. The importance of standards is also 
increasing because of its significant influence for a rapidly growing sector of the 
economy, namely the information, communication and entertainment sector. 
Standards are required in information systems in order to store, retrieve and 
manipulate information (Shapiro 2000). 
 
2.2.2 Definition 
Standards can be defined as “commonly accepted agreements for doing or making 
things” (Ditch 2007:39). Most relevant for the information and communication 
technologies (ICT) is the standardisation which ensures interoperability or 
compatibility between different parts of a product or between products as part of a 
system or network (Ditch 2007:39). One may classify standards into product 
standards, document standards and compatibility standards. Further, there is a 
distinction between mandatory standards and voluntary standards. The latter can 
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be divided into de facto standards, which result either from the interaction 
between “clubs” of agents or through a single agent, and de jure standards, 
specified by standards bodies before adoption in the market. De facto standards 
can either be proprietary or non-proprietary. Since the proprietor of a standard 
controls the licensing of a standard, proprietary standards are excludable. Non-
proprietary standards are non-excludable and can therefore be classified as public 
goods (Mathew 2008:3). Proprietary standards are intended for use within the 
organisation or by their customers, whereas de facto standards are successful 
proprietary standards which have developed through the market over time. 
Collective standards are created in a process where committees of manufacturers, 
research organisations, government departments and consumers cooperate in 
drawing up the standard (Ditch 2007:41). Timothy F. Bresnahan at Stanford 
University divides standards into two concepts; “proprietary” standards implies 
that each software brand for word processing stores files differently, whereas an 
“open” standard implies that any program for word processing will be able to read 
files from other programs (Bresnahan 2001:3). 
 
Standards can be characterised as being information goods. Thereby they are non-
rivalry implying that the distribution of a standard will not decrease its 
availability. Since standards are not necessarily non-excludable, they cannot 
automatically be considered as public goods. This is because it may be possible to 
selectively exclude agents from using and adopting a standard through ownership 
or licensing terms. If only a limited amount of firms cooperate to set standards, 
the process of standard setting will be excludable. Influential firms in standard 
setting can therefore gain competitive advantage because they are able to encode 
the standard based on their own skills and knowledge. Because of this difference 
in influence, one must separate between adoption costs, which is the cost related 
to the implementation of a standard, and sponsoring costs, which is costs related 
to standard setting activities. Markets for compatibility standards which exhibit 
network effects can tip to one standard becoming the dominant in a market. 
Therefore firms will compete to set standards, because whoever controls a 
standard will also control the market structure for its associated products and 
services (Mathew 2008:2). 
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2.2.3 Open standards 
There are several elements related to the openness of standards; the process and 
speed in the creation of a standard, the cost of accessing and using of a standard, 
and copyright or intellectual property barriers when implementing a standard 
(Ditch 2007:41). In particular government agencies are increasingly aware of 
providing all stakeholders with easy access to electronic documents which does 
not require the purchase of a particular software program to view or edit the 
documents. Open standards are hence a key enabler for interoperability. The 
European Union’s Valoris Report defines an open standard as: “The minimum 
requirements for an open standard as that the document format is completely 
described in publicly accessible documents, that this description may be 
distributed freely and that the document format may be implemented in programs 
without restrictions, royalty-fees, and with no legal bindings.” (Valoris 2003:20 
recited in Ditch 2007:9). The openness of OOXML will therefore be further 
addressed in the thesis.  
 
Open standards may solve the issue of compatibility and thereby enable everyone 
to benefit from the network effects. Open standards may also lead to competition 
in a market, as oppose to competition over a market. This will be further discussed 
in the section about benefits and costs of compatibility. 
 
Open standards can have both positive and negative effects on the innovation in a 
market. Open standards may make it easier for other agents to contribute with 
smaller improvements of a product (Sand 2008). Standards classified as public 
goods can promote innovation, as this will enable co-production in the public 
without hindrance. Under such conditions there will be minimal barriers to entry 
to service systems (Mathew 2008:6). On the other side, standards may lead to the 
negative effect of lock-in if an old standard is so widely adopted and well-
established that sufficiently high switching costs prevent consumers from 
adopting a new standard (Mathew 2008:2). The success of a public standard may 
actually contribute to the delay of technological innovation if there are too 
substantial switching and coordination costs related to a new version of a standard 
(Mathew 2008:6). In the case of compatibility standards, network effect may 
cause coordinating problems in the move to a new standard (Mathew 2008:2). 
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Open standards can contribute to solving this coordination problem since open 
standards may make the lock-in problem less present (Sand 2008). 
 
2.2.4 Benefits and costs 
It is reasonable to question whether cooperative standard setting will lead to 
efficient standardisation, increased competition and consumer benefits, or rather 
suppress competition with negative consequences for consumers and firms which 
are not a part of the standard setting group. In order to answer this question about 
the impact of standards, one must analyse the competitive effects of such 
standards (Shapiro 2000:7). 
 
There are both benefits and costs associated with achieving compatibility. A 
benefit described by Shapiro (2000) is greater realization of network effects when 
the size of the network is maximised. For communication networks, the benefit is 
attributed to the fact that users can communicate with any other user. For 
hardware/software networks the benefit for consumers is attributed to the fact that 
firms supplying software components gain access to a larger market. This may 
lead to increased number of entrants, greater variety and increased price and 
innovation competition for software components. Another benefit is the protection 
buyers gain of avoiding stranding. Consumers will not fear being stranded when 
deciding to purchase from a particular supplier if products are compatible 
(Shapiro 2000:8).  
 
Moreover, Katz and Shapiro (1994) describe the circumstances where two firms 
are choosing whether to make their competing systems compatible. For 
hardware/software systems, they state that ultimately the benefits of achieving 
compatibility are appropriated to lower production costs. With compatible 
components in different systems there may be increased opportunities of gain 
through economics of scale, learning effects and technological spillovers in 
component development and production. For communications networks, in such a 
case, compatibility may expand the size of each network to the total size of both. 
This may increase the benefits of gross consumption for a consumer who is part of 
only one of the networks. It also evades the cost of having to hold duplicate 
equipment to participate in both the networks in order to reach all consumers 
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(Katz and Shapiro 1994:109). Page and Lopatka (1999) also proclaim the benefit 
of expanded network size. Consumers of compatible physical networks may 
obtain direct external benefits of communicating with more users, in addition to 
saving the cost of owning two sets of hardware. Consumers of virtual networks 
may gain indirect benefits of an increased network, hereunder a larger range of 
mixable components in addition to reduced risk of stranding with outdated 
technology. The benefits of larger scale may be gained by producers (Page and 
Lopatka 1999:964). 
 
Contrary, a cost which may be associated with standardisation and compatibility 
is constraints on variety and innovation. Requirements in standards impose 
restrictions on firms’ product design choices which may cause static losses from 
the reduction in variety. These restrictions can also lead to dynamic losses when 
firms are prohibited from some R&D paths, that could potentially lead to 
innovations not being in accordance with the standards (Shapiro 2000:8). 
 
Shapiro (2000) also states that compatibility in the presence of network effects 
can fundamentally affect competition. Compatible programs constitute a single 
network, whereas incompatible programs will constitute several different 
networks. Increased adoption of one vendors’ compatible program will benefit 
other vendors’ programs due to the larger network size, and hence not result in 
relative competitive advantage. For incompatible programs however, increased 
adoption of a program would create competitive advantage by increasing its 
network size and value, leaving the network size of other programs unchanged. 
With incompatibility firms will compete for the market, making big investments 
in attempt of becoming the dominant network. Contrary, under compatibility 
firms will compete within the market along other dimensions like price, product 
features and service. Cooperative standard setting will hence decrease the intense 
front-side competition which characterises standard war, at the same time 
permitting increased competition later in products’ life cycle (Shapiro 2000:9). 
This reduction in intense competition at early stages when incompatible systems 
are competing to become the de facto standard is also stated by Page and Lopatka 
(1999:964). Moreover, Katz and Shapiro (1994:111) claim the intensified 
competition later in the product life-cycle as well.   
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There are two opposing forces related to standardisation which can affect firms. 
The first is the drive to standardise in order to gain increasing returns due to the 
network effects. The second is the drive against standardisation because of the 
fear of price competition (Mathew 2008:3). Network effects can increase 
consumers’ value of a good. Further, compatibility standards can generate 
additional services and complementary goods in a market. Through the effect of 
price competition this may reduce costs to consumers. Standards may also benefit 
firms by reducing transactions costs. Hence, firms will have incentives to make 
products and services compatible in order to reduce transaction costs and 
increasing the size of a market through network effects. However, the potential of 
price competition is an opposing driver which can make firms reluctant to 
compatibility (Mathew 2008:1). 
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3. Methodological approach 
 
The methodological approach of this thesis is applied economics where 
constructed models facilitate the addressing of practical questions (Dow 2002:97). 
Deductivism is often the approach applied in microeconomics. Axioms, such as 
rational behaviour of agents, are initially taken to be true, thereafter deductive 
logic is applied to derive indifference curves, and then downward-sloping demand 
curves are constructed. A theoretical proposition is then generated, for example 
the effect on a market of one good by an increase in price of a complementary 
good, ceteris paribus. According to this deductivist approach, assumptions will 
lack realism as ideal types are referred instead of only being simplifications (Dow 
2002:81). 
 
Some of the economic theory that will be presented in the thesis will take the form 
of models. We hereunder intend to present a model of network externalities which 
characterises the market for software. Models are intermediate between theory and 
data, they reconcile between them and models also have their own autonomy 
(Dow 2002:96). Models will be used as a tool to relate theory to the OOXML 
case, and also as a mean for communication core economic ideas.  
 
This thesis will analyse and compare various economic theories, models and 
arguments which have been presented in the standardisation process of OOXML, 
as well as economic theory related to compatibility standards as such. Our further 
literature review will consist of in-depth study of acknowledged economic theory, 
analytical models, market analysis, historical descriptions and material relevant 
for the case, as well as interviews of key agents related to the standardisation 
process in Norway. As follows, we aim to draw reasonable economic conclusions 
for the Norwegian market. It is important to note that the technical aspects of the 
OOXML will not be analysed in this thesis. We will rather study the economic 
implications of this document standard. 
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4. Potential shortcomings 
 
One potential shortcoming is when applying economic theories on real agents in 
real markets. There are trade-offs from gaining the precision of idealized abstract 
theory at the expense of direct applicability for the case in the real market, as well 
as  the gain of a case approach at the expense of generality (Dow 2002:163). What 
in theory may seem obvious and simple may become more complex when 
involving the real world. We aim to formulate the scope of the thesis in a 
comprehensible manner. Theory and applied work in microeconomics are based 
on simplifying assumptions. However, simplifying assumptions are by definition 
required in theory in order of not simply being descriptions. Simplifying 
assumptions might sometimes make economic theory unrealistic (Dow 2002:1).  
 
Another potential shortcoming is the vast amount of information available related 
to the OOXML case, however mostly non-economically founded. Therefore it 
might be a problem to select the most reliable sources. There are conflicting 
concerns in the market due to significant economical and political interests. This 
may motivate the argumentation of all parties in different directions (Hvistendahl 
2003). 
 
An additional potential limitation for the thesis is the difficulty of testing our 
research question empirically because of its complexity. Therefore the final 
arguments may be difficult to re-test in other cases.  
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5. Road map 
 
This road map is a tentative plan for how we aspire to organise the thesis study 
from January till the final deadline the 1
st
 of September 2009. During the entire 
semester we aim to work thoroughly and on a regular weekly basis with the thesis.  
  
After handing in the preliminary thesis the 15
th
 of January 2009 we plan to meet 
with our supervisor in February for comments and further guidance. Points of 
discussion will revolve around the strength and challenges of this preliminary 
thesis, as well as guidance for the coming study. 
 
The next step will be working on the oral presentation of the preliminary thesis. 
With the presentation we aim to enlighten the academic staff and our fellow 
students at the Economic institute at BI The Norwegian School of Management. 
In February we will also do an extensive literature assessment, including the 
background literature presented later. 
 
Continuing, the thesis work in March and April will consist of analysing relevant 
literature. We will emphasise on in-depth study of acknowledged economic 
theory, analytical models, historical descriptions and material relevant for the 
case, market analysis, as well as interviews of key agents involved in the 
standardisation process in Norway, for example Microsoft, “Standard Norge” and 
“Konkurransetilsynet”. During this period we plan to meet with our supervisor to 
discuss points of interests and potential challenges. 
 
From the result of the in-depth study we aim to have a rough copy ready for 
supervision within the end of May. Based on the comments from our supervisor 
we will make additional changes during the summer months. We will also provide 
copies for revision by external advisors who hold a different academic 
background than us. In this manner we aspire to have both academic and linguistic 
comments in order to attain an interesting and accessible thesis for both 
economists and non-economic readers. 
 
The final thesis will be submitted during the end of August 2009.
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